‘RECALCITRANT’ STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE ROLE OF THE UN COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE DEMOCRATIC
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

THE HON. MICHAEL KIRBY* AC CMG &
PROFESSOR SANDEEP GOPALAN**

* Chair of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (2013–14); Justice of the High Court of Australia (19962009); Member of the Council of the Human Rights Institute of the International Bar
Association (2009–present); President of the International Commission of Jurists
(1995–98); and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights
in Cambodia (1993–96).
** Dean and Professor of Law, Deakin University Law School. We are grateful
to Dorian Simmons, Benjamin Johnson, and the editors of the University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law for their excellent editorial work.

229

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

230

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
2.

3.

4.

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 3
THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY .............................................. 9
2.1. The COI’s Methodology ................................................. 13
2.2. The Conduct of Public Hearings .................................... 16
2.3. Participation of Non-State Actors .................................. 20
2.4. The Contribution of International Scholars ................... 21
2.5. Findings .......................................................................... 24
2.6. Aftermath of the COI Report .......................................... 36
RECALCITRANT STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ......... 39
3.1. Is the Outlaw/Rogue Label Analytically Useful?........... 39
3.2. The Objectives of Labelling ............................................. 40
3.3. Objections to Shaming.................................................... 46
3.4. Shaming the State ........................................................... 52
3.5. Shaming the Regime ....................................................... 56
3.6. Shaming North Korea ..................................................... 61
3.7. Shaming is an Effective Punishment .............................. 65
CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 67

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/5

2015]

‘RECALCITRANT’ STATES

231

1. INTRODUCTION
“…there was this pregnant woman who was about 9 months
pregnant. She worked all day. The babies who were born
were usually born dead, but in this case the baby was born
alive. The baby was crying as it was born; we were so
curious, this was the first time we saw a baby being born. So
we were watching this baby and we were so happy. But
suddenly we heard the footsteps. The security agent came
in and this agent of the Bowibu said that . . . usually when a
baby is born we would wash it in a bowl of water, but this
agent told us to put the baby in the water upside down. So
the mother was begging, ‘I was told that I would not be able
to have the baby, but I actually got lucky and got pregnant
so let me keep the baby, please forgive me,’ but this agent
kept beating this woman, the mother who just gave birth.
And the baby, because it was just born, it was just crying.
And the mother, with her shaking hands she picked up the
baby and she put the baby face down in the water. The baby
stopped crying. We saw this water bubble coming out of the
mouth of the baby. And there was an old lady who helped
with the labor, she picked up the baby from the bowl of
water and left the room quietly. So those kind of things
repeatedly happened. That was in the detention center in the
city of Chongjin of Hamgyeong Province.”1
“And you see babies with bloated stomachs. And we also
cooked the snakes and the mouse to feed these babies and if
there was a day that we were able to have mouse, there was
a special diet for us. And so we had to eat everything alive,
every type of meat that we could find, anything that flew,
that crawled on the ground. Any grass that grew in the field,
we had to eat. That’s the reality of the prison camp.”2
1 U.N. Human Rights Council, Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights in the
DPRK, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights
in the DPRK, para. 432, A.HRC/25/CRP.1 (Feb. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Detailed
Findings]; U.N. Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK - Seoul Public
Hearing Day 1 (PM) (Aug. 20, 2013) (02:42:00), http://webtv.un.org/search/
commission-of-inquiry-on-human-rights-in-the-dprk-seoul-public-hearing-day-1pm-20-august/2668611257001?term=%EA%B3%B5%EC%B2%AD%ED%9A%8C.
2 UN Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK- Seoul Public Hearing
Day 2 (AM) (Aug. 21, 2013) (00:31:50), http://webtv.un.org/search/
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North Korea presents unique challenges for the international
legal system. Following the unhappy legacy of its long history and
the Korean War’s aftermath, the country has been under the spell of
one of the most unusual regimes in the world.3 Although the regime
claims socialist ideals, it is accurate to characterise its ideology as
being limited to “Kimjongism.” For long, it has been reported that
the regime has been engaging in human rights violations of the
worst sort:
extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment,
rape, forced abortions and other sexual violence, persecution
on political, religious, racial and gender grounds, the forcible
transfer of populations, the enforced disappearance of
persons and the inhumane act of knowingly causing
prolonged starvation.4
Somewhere between 80,000 and 120,000 political prisoners are
currently being detained in prison camps and subjected to
starvation and other forms of torture. Gender inequality is
pervasive and women are vulnerable to trafficking and sexual
exploitation. Aside from indoctrination from an early age, children
face starvation and other privations.5 Citizens and foreigners
commission-of-inquiry-on-human-rights-in-the-dprk-seoul-public-hearing-day-2am-21-august/2668611256001?term=%EA%B3%B5%EC%B2%AD%ED%9A%8C.
3 See Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 85 (stating that “[t]he imposed
division of the Korean peninsula, the massive destruction that occurred during the
Korean War and the impact of the Cold War have engendered an isolationist mindset and a deep aversion to outside powers.”).
4 Press Release, Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK, North
Korea: UN Commission documents wide-ranging and ongoing crimes against
humanity, urges referral to ICC (Feb. 17, 2014), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14255&LangID=E#sthash.
3UmQISxM.dpuf [hereinafter U.N. Commission Press Release].
5 See Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 542 (stating that “apart from killing
many children, hunger and starvation have also had negative impacts on the longterm development of infants and children.”). Hunger and malnutrition continue to
be widespread in DPRK because of the incompetence and inefficiency of the food
delivery system and of the local markets. According to the evidence, approximately
twenty-seven percent of babies and young children in DPRK are stunted because
of severe malnourishment on the part of their mothers during gestation. These
conclusions are demonstrated in the reports of impartial United Nations agencies
(World Health Organization, Food and Agricultural Organization and World Food
Program) operating in the country. Id. para. 545. The major burden of food scarcity
falls on those citizens deemed “hostile” to the regime under the Songbun system of
classification. Doubtless this is the reason why DPRK refused access for normal
monitoring of food aid, designed to assure donors of the impartiality of donated
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continue to face abductions and disappearances at the hands of the
state apparatus. In the face of this persistent and horrific disregard
for international law norms and institutions, and the continued
commission of crimes against humanity, the international
community has been largely rendered a spectator helplessly
regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a
conundrum for a legal system bereft of direct enforcement
capability.
For long, international responses have taken the form of a slew
of UN resolutions6 and persistent name-calling: the DPRK has been
called a “rogue state” and a member of the “axis of evil”.7 Clearly,
the resolutions have been ineffectual and there is not even
agreement about what the pejorative terms designed to
food distribution. Evidence is recorded in the COI’s report concerning luxury
goods and extravagance by which the ruling elite live well whilst other citizens, less
favoured, starve to death. Id. para. 570.
6 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 825, U.N. Doc. S/RES/825 (May 11, 1993) (calling upon
North Korea to honour its obligations under the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons treaty); S.C. Res. 1695, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1695 (July 15, 2006) (strongly
urging North Korea to abandon nuclear programs and return to non-proliferation
talks); S.C. Res. 1718, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006) (demanding that North
Korea abandon its nuclear programs, stating efforts to enforce that demand, and
forming a committee of the Security Council to monitor those efforts); S.C. Res.
1874, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009) (recalling previous relevant provisions
and reiterating provisions in singular resolution); S.C. Res. 1928, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1928 (June 7, 2010) (requesting that the Panel of Experts provide reports to
the Council); S.C. Res. 1985, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1985 (June 10, 2011) (extending the
Council’s request that the Panel of Experts provide reports to the Council); S.C. Res.
2050, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2050 (June 12, 2012) (extending the Council’s request that
the Panel of Experts provide reports to the Council); S.C. Res. 2087, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/2087 (Jan. 22, 2013) (condemning North Korea’s nuclear launch and calling
on Member States to enforce previous provisions); S.C. Res. 2094, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/2094 (Mar. 7, 2013) (condemning North Korea’s nuclear launch and calling
on Member States to enforce actions to prevent nuclear proliferation); and S.C. Res.
2141, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2141 (Mar. 5, 2014) (extending the Council’s request that
the Panel of Experts provide reports to the Council). For instance, the UN General
Assembly resolution, dated December 18, 2014, which was adopted with 116 votes
for, 20 against, and 53 abstentions, acknowledged that “crimes against humanity
have been committed in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, pursuant to
policies established at the highest level of the State for decades” and called on the
Security Council to take “appropriate action to ensure accountability, including
through consideration of referral of the situation in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea to the International Criminal Court.” G.A. Res. 69/188, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/69/188 (Dec. 18, 2014).
7 “The fact that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has for decades
pursued policies involving crimes that shock the conscience of humanity raises
questions about the inadequacy of the response of the international community.”
U.N. Commission Press Release, supra note 4.
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communicate deviant status actually mean or how to define a state
as a pariah. Coevally, a number of other terms such as renegade,8
outcast,9 deviant,10 and recalcitrant are employed to refer to these
states at different periods in time by political actors and scholars.
Despite the serious challenges posed by such a state to international
law, the phenomenon of the recalcitrant state has not received
adequate study by scholars of international law. Much less, the
potency and relevance of international law in relation to such states
remains under-theorized. In this light, the establishment of the UN
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights,11 and the publication of
its widely endorsed report,12 offers an avenue for developing our
understanding as to what to do about recalcitrant states such as the
DPRK.
There is a substantial and growing literature about the role of
international human rights organizations such as Amnesty
International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) in improving
human rights conditions in countries. These organizations adopt
naming and shaming strategies to highlight rights violations, raise
MIROSLAV NINCIC, RENEGADE REGIMES (2007).
EFRAIM INBAR, OUTCAST COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1985).
10 DEON GELDENHUYS, DEVIANT CONDUCT IN WORLD POLITICS (2004).
11 The UN Human Rights Council (HRC) established the Commission of
Inquiry (COI) by a resolution adopted on April 9, 2013. See Situation of human
rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, G.A. Res. 22/13, paras. 3, 5,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/22/13 (Apr. 9, 2013) (establishing that the HRC
8
9

decides to establish, for a period of one year, a commission of inquiry
comprising three members, one of whom should be the Special
Rapporteur, with the other two members appointed by the President of
the Human Rights Council . . . Further decides that the commission of
inquiry will investigate the systematic, widespread and grave violations
of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as outlined
in paragraph thirty-one of the report of the Special Rapporteur, including
the violation of the right to food, the violations associated with prison
camps, torture and inhuman treatment, arbitrary detention,
discrimination, violations of freedom of expression, violations of the right
to life, violations of freedom of movement, and enforced disappearances,
including in the form of abductions of nationals of other States, with a
view to ensuring full accountability, in particular where these violations
may amount to crimes against humanity . . . ).
12 Contrary to the overwhelming consensus on the high quality report, A
North Korean official termed the evidence “the fabricated testimonies of a handful
of defectors who committed crimes and abandoned the country.” Rick Gladstone,
United Nations Urges North Korea Prosecutions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2014, http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/world/asia/north-korea-united-nations-icchuman-rights-abuses.html?_r=0.
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media and public awareness, and precipitate international action.13
While they are not always successful,14 some evidence indicates that
states targeted by these campaigns do improve their practices.15 For
scholars who believe in the ability of human rights organizations to
achieve positive change, the key is the utilization of shame16 to
persuade the recalcitrant state that its actions might undermine its
domestic and international legitimacy, or its aspirational self-image
and identity.17 Alternatively, shaming might be effective by
generating sufficient pressure on other members of the international
community so that they are forced to take action against the
13 See Alison Brysk, From Above and Below: Social Movements, the International
System, and Human Rights in Argentina, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 259, 259–85 (Oct. 1993)
(discussing the impact of the international system on social movements and change
in Argentina).
14 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human
Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 INT’L ORG. 689, 689–716 (2008) (documenting
situations in which naming and shaming has proven successful).
15 Amanda M. Murdie & David R. Davis, Shaming and Blaming: Using Events
Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs, 56 INT’L STUD. Q. 1, 1 (2012)
(“Improvements in human rights practices result from the interaction of shaming
by HROs with: 1. Large number of HROs present within the state. This domestic
presence of HROs helps local social movements pressure their regime for improved
human rights ‘from below’ (Brysk 1993). 2. Shaming of the regime by third-party
states,
individuals,
and
organizations.
When
third
parties, citing the work of HROs, join advocacy efforts, the impact of HROs
increases due to pressure ‘from above.’”) (internal citations omitted); see also James C.
Franklin, Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political Repression
in Latin America, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 187, 187 (2008) (studying the response of Latin
American governments who have been shamed for human rights violations).
16 See June Tangney et al., Are Shame, Guilt, and Embarrassment Distinct
Emotions?, 70 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1256, 1256 (1996) (studying the
differences between shame, guilt, and embarrassment and finding that shame was
no more likely than guilt to be experienced in public situations). In subsequent
work, Tangney et al. note that

shame involves a negative evaluation of the global self; guilt involves a
negative evaluation of a specific behavior. Although this distinction may,
at first glance, appear rather subtle, empirical research supports that this
differential emphasis on self (“I did that horrible thing”) versus behavior
(“I did that horrible thing”) sets the stage for very different emotional
experiences and very different patterns of motivations and subsequent
behavior.
June Tangney et al., Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 345,
349 (2007).
17 See Thomas Risse & Kathyn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human
Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: An Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE, 1, 1-38 (1999) (exploring the
impact of international human rights norms on several countries in different
regions).
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offender.18 The first pathway for affecting state behavior is not
available when the offender is a state such as North Korea, and the
second pathway is of unknown utility because self-image and
identity can be highly subjective. Moreover, shaming might have
perverse consequences by bolstering domestic legitimacy and
identity by casting the ruler as a victim of hostile external
propaganda. Therefore, the international community’s toolkit is
limited to the third pathway – pressuring law-abiding states to
enforce international law norms against the offender – and we
expand on the role of labelling and shaming to generate pressure
under international law that may be applicable to such states,
identifying its target and scope. Thereafter, we consider some
objections to shaming and posit that the Commission of Inquiry
(COI) mechanism addresses many of the theoretical objections.
First, the COI possesses both authority and legitimacy because it is
established pursuant to a formal legal process and its work is subject
to legal standards. Although it is not a judicial tribunal, the COI
provides robust procedural safeguards: a transparent methodology,
acceptable standards of proof, due process rights to the accused, and
a legal framework to assess violations committed by the offender.
Second, the COI is a neutral and independent entity capable of
making assessments about facts and determinations about
violations of international law obligations without being tainted by
partisanship. Third, because the COI is not a judicial tribunal or a
prosecutor, and the setting is not adversarial, there are incentives for
the accused regime to participate in its work and contribute to the
establishment of accurate facts. Thereafter, it has the ability to take
corrective action if blame is assessed, without the taint of legal
liability, thereby achieving rehabilitation goals. Fourth, because of
the location of the COI within the UN architecture, shaming is
addressed both to the offending regime and the other member
states. This is key to its authority—to assert legal authority delegated
by member states pursuant to the organization’s constitutional
documents and legal rules, to reiterate the binding nature of
international law norms to participants and observers and thereby
deter other potential offenders, and to ensure that law-abiding states
take action against violators.
Having subscribed to an
18 See James Lebovic & Erik Voeten, The Politics of Shame, The Condemnation of
Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR, 50 INT’L STUD. Q. 861, 861 (Dec. 2006)
(analyzing the United Nations Commission on Human Rights’ targeting and
punishment of countries who violated human rights norms).
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organization’s charter and consented to binding legal obligations,
states do not have the luxury of claiming that they are unaware of
violations or that the facts have not been independently assessed.
Therefore, states cannot resort to responsibility-shifting and freeriding after a well-publicized report issued by a UN agency if they
expect the international legal order to hold. As the COI said to the
Human Rights Council (HRC) at the time of presentation of the COI
report concerning the risk of inaction by way of follow up: “[n]ow,
we cannot say we do not know about DPRK. Now we all know and
there is no excuse.” In March 2014, in answer to the demand by the
DPRK ambassador in Geneva that the international community
should “mind its own business,” the COI told members of the UN
Security Council in New York: “[these] crimes are indeed the
world’s ‘business’ and the world is watching. Respectfully, if this is
not a case for action by the Security Council, it is hard to image one
that ever would be.”19
The paper is organized as follows. Part II details the work of the
Commission of Inquiry, its methodology, and key findings. Part III
outlines a theoretical model for shaming and labelling in
international law, considers several objections, and makes a novel
normative argument for a greater utilization of the COI procedure
in international law. Part IV concludes.
2. THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
The COI on human rights in the DPRK was established by a
resolution of the HRC of the United Nations on 21 March 2013.20 The
resolution was adopted without dissent or call for a vote. It reflected
the growing exasperation of the international community over the
refusal of the government of DPRK to permit the entry of, or to
engage with, officials of the UN human rights system, including the
Special Rapporteur designated by the HRC to investigate and report
on human rights in the country.21 Although DPRK had ratified four
19 Address by the Chair of the COI on DPRK to the members of the Security
Council, unpublished, 17 April 2014, New York.
20 G.A. Res. 22/13, supra note 11.
21 There have been two Special Rapporteurs on North Korea: Professor Vitit
Muntarbhorn (Thailand) and Mr Marzuki Darusman (Indonesia). The latter, still
in office, was also a member of the COI in accordance with the mandate of the HRC.
As the COI notes
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major UN human rights treaties, it had unsuccessfully sought to
withdraw from the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).22 In 2013, it had refused to accept a single
recommendation for improvement in its human rights situation,
made during its first participation in the Universal Periodic Review
(UPR) in 2009–10.23 No other member state of the United Nations
has had such a lamentable record of non-cooperation.

The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea has not had access to the country since the
inception of the mandate in 2004. . . . not a single mandate holder of the
Human Rights Council has been invited, or permitted, to visit the DPRK .
. . the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights
have also issued periodic reports detailing human rights violations and
related impunity in the DPRK. The DPRK has not provided substantive
input to these reports since it has rejected the underlying resolutions of
the General Assembly and Human Rights Council.
Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 11-12.
22 It was informed, on the basis of the advice of the UN General Counsel, that
there was no authority to withdraw. It accepted that advice and continued
engagement.
23 See generally G.A. Res. 67/L.50, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/67/L.50 (Nov. 9, 2012)
(expressing concern of North Korea’s violation of and strongly urging North Korea
to respect human rights). The UNHRC Resolution of 2013 in its preamble expressed
its serious concern at the refusal of the government of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea to articulate, by the time of the adoption by the
Human Rights Council of the outcome report of its universal periodic
review in March 2010, which recommendations enjoyed its support, and
regretting the lack of action taken by the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea to date to implement the recommendations of that report.
G.A. Res. 22/13, supra note 11. See also Press Release, Pillay urges more attention to
human rights abuses in North Korea, calls for international inquiry (Jan. 14, 2013),
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12923&LangID=E (calling for international inquiry
into the human rights abuses occurring in North Korea). The Universal Periodic
Review of North Korea conducted in 2009–10 resulted in over one hundred
recommendations to improve human rights, but North Korea refused to identify
one recommendation it would implement. See Press Release, Human Rights
Council adopts outcomes of Universal Periodic Review on Bhutan, Dominica and
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.
ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=9921&LangID=
E (noting that the Council urged North Korea to implement the recommendations).
In November 2012, a North Korean delegate to the UN called “the report of the
special rapporteur . . . a product of the hostile policies of the United States and
European Union against the DPRK (North Korea) and is a typical example of
politicization, double standards and selectivity on the issue of human rights.” Jo
Yong-Hak, North Korea Says Proud of its Human Rights Record, REUTERS, Nov. 3, 2012,
http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCABRE8A11F120121103.
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The COI members included the current Special Rapporteur (Mr.
Marzuki Darusman, Indonesia), together with Ms. Sonja Biserko (a
Serbian human rights expert), and one of the authors of this article
(Justice Kirby). The latter two members were appointed by the
President of the HRC in May 2013. The Special Rapporteur served
ex-officio.
It is important to note that a COI of the HRC is independent of
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
It is required to be independent not only of the High Commissioner
but of the HRC and of all extraneous influences. The commissioners
of the COI were not acting as United Nations judges or prosecutors.
Their duty was to the mandate given to the COI by the HRC and
their role was as expert factfinders, with a duty to report to the HRC
in accordance with its resolution. In the case of the DPRK, that
resolution identified nine separate subject matters of human rights
upon which a report was required.24 It also instructed the COI to
document human rights violations, victim and perpetrator accounts,
and to ensure accountability for such wrongs.25 The COI was
obliged to report to the HRC by March 2014.26 Although the time
under report was not specified, it potentially extended back to the
foundation of the DPRK, as a result of an artificial border imposed
by the victorious Allies upon the Korean peninsula at the conclusion
of the Second World War.27 That border terminated more than a
24 The nine matters identified were: violations associated with prison camps;
violations of thought, expression and religion; arbitrary arrest and detention;
violations of the right to food; discrimination and, in particular, systemic denial and
violation of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms; violations to the right
to life; violations of the freedom of individual movement; and enforced
disappearances, including abductions of foreign nationals. Detailed Findings, supra
note 1, at 6-7.
25 The COI report notes the following objectives: “(a) Further investigating and
documenting human rights violations; (b) Collecting and documenting victim and
perpetrator accounts; (c) Ensuring accountability.” Detailed Findings, supra note 1,
para. 15.
26 UN Human Rights Council resolution A/HRC/RES/22/13, 9 April 2013,
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G13/128/65/
PDF/G1312865.pdf?OpenElement (“Requests the commission of inquiry to present
an oral update to the Human Rights Council at its twenty-fourth session and to the
General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session, and a written report to the Council at
its twenty-fifth session.”)
27 The mandate did not specify a geographic boundary either: “Commission
has interpreted its mandate to include alleged violations perpetrated by the DPRK
against its nationals both within and outside the DPRK as well as those violations
that involve extraterritorial action originating from the DPRK, such as the
abductions of non-DPRK nationals.” Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 19.
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thousand years of united government, including 34 years (1911–
1945) under Japanese imperial rule.
The commissioners’ made a decision to gather testimony by
public hearings thereby imposing novel burdens both on the
commissioners and the secretariat. However, the COI, with the
support of the secretariat, brought its report to completion on time.
Effectively, although the first substantive meeting of the COI was
held at the beginning of July 2013, the report was written and
finalised by the end of January 2014. It was published online on 17
February 2014.28 It was formally presented to the HRC in Geneva
on 17 March 201429 and to members of the Security Council (SC) in
New York on 17 April 2014.30
The COI’s pathbreaking work included the testimony of Shin
Dong-hyuk, the only person known to have escaped political prison
camp number 14 into which he was born as the child of adult
prisoners confined there. Other potent testimony was given by a
witness who saw a baby of a refugee required to be drowned in a
bucket because of objections to the Chinese ethnicity of its father.
This was regarded as contaminating “pure” Korean blood. A
witness from a family of persons abducted under the DPRK’s state
policy of abducting Republic of Korea (ROK), Japanese, and other
nationals deemed useful to the DPRK regime also provided
testimony. The COI’s report attracted unprecedented international
media attention and focused states’ attention on horrific
international crimes against humanity.
2.1. The COI’s Methodology
At the first in-person meeting of the Commissioners in Geneva
in early July 2013, a full day was devoted to adopting a methodology
Detailed Findings, supra note 2.
For the full chronology of events see Sec. Council, DPRK (North Korea)
Chronology of Events (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/
chronology/dprk-north-korea.php.
30 The Report was transmitted by the Permanent Representatives of Australia,
France, and the United States by way of a letter addressed to the President of the
Security Council. U.N. S.C., transmitted by letter dated Apr. 14, 2014 from the
Permanent Representatives of Australia, France, and the United States of America
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2014/276 (Apr. 14, 2014), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.
org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2014_276.pdf.
28
29

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/5

2015]

‘RECALCITRANT’ STATES

241

for the working of the COI.31 This was especially important because
the DPRK communicated to the President of the Human Rights
Council that it “totally and categorically rejects the Commission of
Inquiry”32 and repeatedly refused to cooperate with the COI.33 In
order to respond to this attitude, the COI had to adopt a novel,
transparent, and innovative methodology: public hearings.34 This
methodology is not common to UN inquiries, the one exception
being the COI on the Occupied Territories, chaired by a former
judge of common law background (Justice Richard Goldstone of
South Africa).
The Commissioners determined that the COI’s process must be
transparent in order to counteract the inevitable attacks and
criticisms that would follow concerning the truthfulness and
representativity of the witnesses giving testimony to the COI. They
resolved that the collection of testimony at public hearings would
be the centrepiece of their inquiry. There were collateral advantages
to public hearings: they would raise public consciousness of the
suffering of the victims; establish the duration, nature, variety and
intensity of their burdens; and it would help engage the national and
international media during the conduct of the inquiry. All of these
intuitive judgements of the COI proved to be correct.
At the onset, the COI distributed public calls for evidence. In the
available time, its secretariat interviewed more than 240 witnesses.
In recognition of the fact that most of the witnesses were refugees
31 See Detailed Findings, supra note 1, paras. 12–20 (detailing the development
of the methodology for the COI and how it was implemented).
32 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 21.
33 The HRC resolution establishing the COI urged the Government of DPRK
to cooperate fully with the Commission’s investigation; to permit the members of
the COI unrestricted access to visit the country; and to provide them with all
information necessary to enable them to fulfil their mandate. At the very
beginning, the DPRK stated publicly that it would “totally reject and disregard” the
resolution. It claimed that this was “a product of political confrontation and
conspiracy”. Michael Kirby, Moment of truth for North Korea over human rights, CNN
(Nov. 18, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/18/opinion/north-korea-unresolution-kirby/.
34 Secretariat members in the DPRK COI (most of whom came from civilian
legal backgrounds) expressed some reasonable hesitations and concerns about the
proposed methodology. There was anxiety about the effective protection of the
identity and safety of witnesses; about maintaining security for the COI itself and
its personnel, as well as for witnesses and deponents; about preventing possible
disruption of hearings and meetings; about procuring, assembling and delivering
witnesses according to the comprehensive hearing timetable; about obtaining
suitable facilities outside national government premises (which were considered
inappropriate); and about the cost implications thought likely to arise.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

242

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:1

who had fled DPRK but had family living in that country, a majority
were not permitted to offer public testimony in order to ensure
compliance with the mandate instruction that no harm came to
witnesses. Their evidence was then received in a private and
confidential setting. However, other witnesses (some 84) gave
evidence in public. In a few cases physical disguises were adopted.
In others, great care was taken to avoid, by public questioning,
inessential identification of places and of people who might be
harmed. The DPRK news bureau described the witnesses as
“human scum”.35 Although one or two witnesses may have
occasionally added a gloss to their testimony, overwhelmingly they
were judged by the COI to be truthful and convincing witnesses.
When they were attacked by DPRK, the COI was able to invite
everyone with access to the internet (which excluded most citizens
in DPRK where such access is prohibited) to view the testimony
online and to reach their own conclusions.36
The COI also had constant contact with the DPRK missions in
Geneva and New York. Repeatedly, the COI invited participation
in the hearings; commentary and correction of the draft report when
completed; an opportunity, when the report was produced, to travel
to DPRK to brief officials and citizens on its content; and to answer
questions.37 Eventually, the final report was supplied to the
Supreme Leader of DPRK (Kim Jong-un), repeating the foregoing
offers and concluding with a warning about his own possible future
personal responsibility under international criminal law.38 Such
35 Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, Questions and Answers on the Report of the United Nations Commission of
Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 5 (Feb. 17,
2014),
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/
HRCouncil/CoIDPRK/Report/coi-dprk-q-and-a.pdf (noting that news reports
called the public hearings “slander” and the participants “human scum”).
36 To view the testimony online see Comm’n of Inquiry on Human Rights in
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, see Public Hearings, http://www.
ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/PublicHearings.aspx (listing
the documents containing testimony from the public hearings).
37 Press Release, OHCHR, UN Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea Set to
Begin Hearings in Japan (Aug. 23, 2013), available at http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13653&LangID=E#sthash.
PJmEOF9l.dpuf (noting the schedule and structure of the public hearings in Japan).
38 See U.N. Human Rights Council, Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights in the
DPRK, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights
in the DPRK, Annex I, A.HRC/25/63 (Feb. 7, 2014) (including a letter submitted to
His Excellency detailing the findings of the Commission and the potential
ramifications under international law) [hereinafter Detailed Findings II].
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letters were ignored or, where answered, replied to with a reminder
of the DPRK’s determination of non-engagement.
Specifically, the COI invited DPRK to send a representative to
the public hearings. It offered to permit that representative to make
submissions and to call testimony on its behalf. It indicated that
such a representative could, with leave, question witnesses.
Arrangements were made with ROK to accord any such
representative(s), nominated by DPRK, diplomatic immunity. No
such representation was arranged by DPRK. It is unknown
whether, amongst the members of the public attending the hearings
of the COI, DPRK arranged for participation or representation
anonymously. Because the elite in DPRK has access to the internet,
it must be assumed that they, and government agents in and outside
North Korea, would have had full access to the entirety of the public
hearings held by the COI.
The public hearings of the COI took place in Seoul, ROK (August
2013); Tokyo, Japan (August 2013); London, UK (October 2013) and
Washington, DC (October 2013).39 The grouping of public hearings
was arranged partly to save costs. Officers of the secretariat visited
the venues in advance of the COI Commissioners so as to interview
and arrange witnesses for the hearings. All testimony (for public
and confidential consideration) was made available to the
Commissioners. The responsibility of eliciting the evidence in
public fell on the Commissioners, primarily by questions addressed
from the chair. Witnesses were taken through statements provided
by the secretariat, using non-leading questions so as to permit the
witnesses to give their evidence in their own words. Subsequently,
the report of the COI contained on most pages references to
testimony and small extracts from the transcript of actual evidence.
These extracts are generally expressed in much more direct and

39 The COI methodology proves that, in today’s world, no country can entirely
exclude itself from investigation by the human rights organs of the world
community. If the door is slammed shut by violators, investigation can take place
outside the territory in question, drawing upon refugees who are pre-vetted to
ensure that they are genuine, reliable and not unduly biased as a result of any
ordeal they may have suffered. Notably, the COI also sought to visit China but the
request was rebuffed: “On 20 November 2013, the Permanent Mission informed the
Secretariat that, given China’s position on country-specific mandates, especially on
the Korean peninsula, it would not be possible to extend an invitation to the
Commission.” Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 45.
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vivid language than expert chroniclers usually produce. They gave
voice to the actual lived experiences of victims.40
The report also demonstrates two features as a result of this
procedure of uploading digital images of witnesses and transcripts
(in the English, Korean and Japanese languages) on the COI website.
First, as demonstrated by Holocaust studies, gathered after 1945,
victims often feel guilty about surviving when so many friends and
family have perished. Whilst they are naturally upset and angry,
once they begin recounting their stories, they normally follow their
own chronological course. Normally, they are remarkable for their
clarity and understatement. Second, the horrors recounted do not
require exaggeration in order to have an impact. The low-key way
in which the testimony was ordinarily given by the witnesses before
the COI made it all the more impressive.
2.2. The Conduct of Public Hearings
The COI’s decision to conduct public hearings raised both
process and substantive questions in relation to witnesses. For
instance, there were questions about the reliability of witnesses
given that a majority (experts apart) were refugees who had already
made a decision to leave DPRK. One of the concerns was that the
testimony of the witnesses was out of date and therefore unhelpful.41
Furthermore, there was no shortage of witnesses: in ROK there are
over 26,000 refugees from DPRK and significant numbers are also
present in other countries. Many of these refugees were willing to
come forward and offer testimony, raising questions about how to
select witnesses and complete the work within time. In the end, the
COI had to terminate the flow of witnesses so as to concentrate on
selecting, and analysing, a representative sample who could speak
to the nine-point mandate given by the HRC.
In assessing reliability of witness testimony, the COI adopted a
two-part test: first, a judgement based on impressions of credibility
and non-exaggeration; and second, corroboration by other
witnesses unknown to the person giving testimony, including
effective corroboration by satellite images and documentation
40 This technique brings the report of the COI on DPRK to life. It makes it a
much more readable document than most UN reports.
41 This is because enhanced barriers at the borders between DPRK and China
have reduced the flow of asylum seekers into China since 2012.
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available, both from DPRK itself and from UN and other agencies
operating in DPRK (such as World Food Program (WFP)).42
Crucially, facts about the persecution of religious minorities are, to
some extent, confirmed by published official data on religious
adherents, deriving from DPRK records.43 Similarly, statements
about the pernicious Songbun system of social caste are confirmed
by speeches by DPRK officials, including successive Supreme
Leaders. Remarkably, those leaders appear to be proud, and not
ashamed, of labelling people at their birth with a social caste
(classified as ‘core’, ‘wavering,’ and ‘hostile’ classes), upon the basis
of which opportunities for education, housing, employment,
political advancement, and food accessibility are decided.
The legal framework for the COI’s work was provided by the
international law instruments voluntarily entered into by the DPRK.
Specifically, obligations under the ICCPR, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) provided legal content in order to assess the DPRK’s
responsibility.44 In relation to crimes against humanity, the Rome
42 The following considerations were taken into account in assessing
credibility:

(a) the witness’s political and personal interests, potential biases and past
record of reliability (if known); (b) the witness’s apparent capacity to
correctly recall events, considering his or her age, trauma, how far back
the events occurred, etc.; (c) the position of the witness in relation to the
subject of the information; (d) where and how the witness obtained the
information; and (e) the reasons for which the witness provided the
information.
Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 73.
43 The COI made a distinction between information and testimony: “any piece
of information had to be assessed for its validity by considering, amongst other
factors, the information’s relevance to the inquiry, its internal consistency and
coherence, its logicality and its consistency with and corroboration by other
information.” Id. para. 74.
44 Article 18 of the ICCPR providing for the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion and article 20 were relevant for allegations about the
indoctrination of citizens; articles 19 and 22 were relevant for assessing violations
of the right to freedom of speech, expression, and association. See International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 18, 19, 20, and 22, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(Mar. 23, 1976) (including the rights to freedom of thought, conscience, religion,
speech, expression and association). Articles 12, 13, 14, 15 and 17 of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) were also relevant in the context of children. See
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (Feb. 16, 2005) (recognizing
the same rights for children).
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Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and customary
international law provided content.
The COI accepted for itself a rigorous standard of proof,
common to United Nations COIs of reported human rights
violations.45 It accepted the “reasonable grounds for belief”
standard. It judged available testimony against the legal obligations
binding on the DPRK as a State Party to the United Nations Charter
and to international human rights treaties and as a State subject to
customary international law.46 The COI made a conclusion that a
fact was established when “it was satisfied that it had obtained a
reliable body of information, consistent with other material, based
on which a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would have
reason to believe that such an incident or pattern of conduct had
occurred.”47
Where there was any doubt or uncertainty as to any finding or
conclusion (as in the suggested deployment in and by DPRK of
chemical weapons), the COI refrained from expressing a final
conclusion, leaving several matters of that kind for the future.
Similarly, where international law was in a possible state of
evolution (as in the possible availability of the international crime of
genocide in cases of annihilation of a section of the population on
grounds of political belief48) the COI held back from expressing a
conclusion on the possible infringement of such a law.49
Notably, due to the fierce propaganda contest that exists in and
near the Korean peninsula, care had to be taken in the use of media
reports and in accepting the official positions of affected
45 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, paras. 63–78 (detailing the legal framework
and standard of proof for the Commission).
46 Id. paras. 63–64 (recognizing the legal obligations DPRK assumed as a State
Party to treaties, as well as binding customary international law).
47 As the COI’s Detailed Findings note, “[t]his standard of proof is lower than
the standard required in criminal proceedings to sustain an indictment, but is
sufficiently high to call for further investigations into the incident or pattern of
conduct and, where available, initiation of the consideration of a possible
prosecution.” Id. para. 68.
48 Id. paras. 1155–59 (describing how the human rights abuses in North Korea
are similar to the accepted definition of genocide).
49 However, it did indicate its inclination in that respect. There was already so
much material (and findings on so many human rights violations and crimes
against humanity) that this principle of prudent restraint appeared to be
appropriate. Id. para. 1158 (“The Commission is sympathetic to the possible
expansion of the current understanding of genocide. However, in light of finding
many instances of crimes against humanity, the Commission does not find it
necessary to explore these theoretical possibilities here”).
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governments. For instance, widespread reports that following his
execution in December 2013, the uncle of the Supreme Leader, Jang
Sung-thaek had been fed to wild dogs, were eventually traced to a
Chinese social media source. It was a fictitious rumour. So was a
report that the former girlfriend of the Supreme Leader Kim Jongun had been executed by firing squad in connection with indecent
behaviour. In May 2014 she appeared in a television program
praising the Supreme Leader. The COI kept an appropriate distance
from the governments of concerned countries and was
appropriately sceptical of Korean and other news reports.
In accordance with its mandate, the COI was also extremely
careful to attend to its duties to undertake proper recordkeeping,
protection of the confidentiality and identity of victims, and the safe
archiving of its materials.50 On the recommendations of the COI, the
High Commissioner for Human Rights was urged to continue the
collection of evidence and to establish a secure archive for the safekeeping of all information gathered by, or for, the COI.51

50 There were no significant breaches of confidentiality and security affecting
witnesses, either in the public hearings of the COI or otherwise. Special assistance
was provided by United Nations Security for the conduct of the public hearings
and in the COI’s movements between venues. Only on two occasions during the
public hearings was anything said, or revealed, which was of potential
embarrassment. A firm instruction from the chair had the effect of curtailing media
reportage of that item and the transcript and record were redacted to delete the
identifiers. There was no disruption of public hearings or any instance of undue
danger nor concern on the part of witnesses. One witness who later saw the report
of the COI, suggested that the editing of the report of that person’s testimony had
potentially given an incorrect impression of what was said. Although it was not
possible later to edit or amend the published report of the COI to meet this concern,
a letter was given to the witness by the COI affirming the full detail of what had
been said, as appearing in the official transcript. The existence of the transcript, and
its broad availability, provided a proper protection for the witness. Id. para. 13
(describing the mandate of the Commission).
51 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 94(d); see also U.N. H.R.C. Res.
25/CRP.1, supra note 2, para. 1225(d) (“The High Commissioner for Human Rights
should continue the OHCHR’s engagement with the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea”). After the report of the COI was delivered, an agreement was announced
in May 2014, between OHCHR and the Government of ROK, for the establishment
in ROK, as recommended by the COI, of a field office, inter alia to continue the
collection and recording of testimony by victims of human rights abuse in DPRK.
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2.3. Participation of Non-State Actors
Because of its small secretariat and limited budget, the COI on
DPRK had to secure a measure of assistance and support from
outsiders. These included government agencies, and there were
numerous meetings throughout the COI process with
representatives of the governments of interested countries.52
International human rights agencies proved invaluable in
providing testimony; affording contact with victims; making
submissions to the COI; supporting side events at the HRC, GA and
SC; and participating in, and stimulating, the drafting of United
Nations resolutions and procuring follow up to the COI report.53
HRW played an important role in ceaselessly advocating the
creation of the COI.54 Similarly, AI facilitated contact with expert
and other witnesses, particularly in London and Washington, DC.
It provided the COI with satellite imagery that was important to
contradict DPRK’s assertion that there were no political prison
camps in North Korea.
The COI also made contact during its investigations, including
following delivery of its report, with international think tanks, such
as the Robert Kennedy Foundation in Washington, DC.55
52 Although DPRK itself refused repeated requests to engage with it, the COI
called on (and reported progress to) the governments of Australia, China, France,
Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Lao DPR, the Russian Federation,
Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. In ROK, Japan,
the UK and US, the Commission made contact with national bodies concerned with
particular aspects of the mandate and representatives of victims and their families.
These bodies played a useful role in stimulating attention to the condition of human
rights in DPRK when (as is often the case), the record tends to lapse for want of upto-date information.
53 In addition to HRW and AI, the International Commission of Jurists and the
International Service for Human Rights provided valuable assistance. Detailed
Findings, paras. 49-50.
54 William Cornforth, North Korea: Launch a UN Commission of Inquiry, UN
Investigation Needed to Document “Systematic and Egregious” Rights Abuses, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/21/northkorea-launch-un-commission-inquiry.
55 After the report was delivered, the COI made contact with The Graduate
Institute Geneva, the Geneva Academy of International and Humanitarian Law, the
Asser Institute in the Netherlands and The Hague Academy for Global Justice, as
well as the Gresham College in London. Engagement was likewise made with the
Holocaust Museum and Brookings Institution (Washington DC) and with the
Council on Foreign Relations (New York), coinciding with the COI briefing to
members of the Security Council. Following the delivery of the COI report, contact
has been established with international bodies of lawyers, such as LAWASIA and
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2.4. The Contribution of International Scholars
An enormous literature has developed, especially in recent
years,56 concerning DPRK. There are notable well-respected
scholars whose writings assisted the COI, including Professor
Andrei Lankov (ROK and Australia),57 Professor Leonid Petrov
(Australia) and Professor Victor Cha (US).58 An important part of
the work of the Commissioners and secretariat involved absorbing
this large body of information and opinion, whilst continuing to
move forward with the preparation of the report in what was
effectively little more than half a year of real time.
One matter upon which dialogue with the jurists was especially
helpful concerned the ambit of the international crime of
“genocide.”59 In international law, genocide has been defined as
including various grave and violent acts committed “with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such.”60 The COI received submissions urging a finding
of genocide against DPRK. Certainly, because of strong testimony
that indicated violent acts in political prison camps and conduct that
resulted, deliberately or recklessly, in many deaths from starvation,
affecting at least hundreds of thousands of DPRK citizens, a
conclusion that a type of genocide had occurred appeared open. The
difficulty was the emphasis which the crime of genocide had
hitherto taken from “national, ethnical, racial or religious”

the International Bar Association (IBA), universities and concerned NGOs in ROK
and the Asia Society and United Nations Association in the United States of
America.
56 See generally DANIELLE CHUBB, CONTENTIOUS ACTIVISM & INTER-KOREAN
RELATIONS (2014) (analyzing recent North Korea-South Korea relations).
57 See generally ANDREI LANKOV, THE REAL NORTH KOREA: LIFE AND POLITICS IN
THE FAILED STALINIST UTOPIA (2013) (providing an overview of the politics,
government and foreign relations of DPRK); Detailed Findings, supra note 1 at para.
592–593.
58 See generally VICTOR CHA, THE IMPOSSIBLE STATE: NORTH KOREA, PAST AND
FUTURE (2012) (describing the country, its secrecy, and the factors that have allowed
the regime to persist for so long).
59 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1155 (raising the question of whether
a genocide has occurred in DPRK).
60 Id. para. 1156 (citing the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide and including international law’s definition of genocide); see also
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (establishing the International Criminal Court).
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motivations of violators and the doubts that existed that such
specific motivations existed in the case of DPRK.
To be sure, the extension of the crime of genocide to include
extermination on religious grounds was originally affected by the
classification of the extermination of Jews in Europe in the 1930s-40s
as ‘genocide’. In the case of these victims, the motives were
commonly both ethnic and religious. However, religion is not an
inbuilt personal characteristic of human beings as racial and like
characteristics are. It is a set of convictions, spiritual beliefs and
philosophical/moral commitments that are acquired after birth –
mostly in childhood or sometimes later in life. In this respect, the
religious ground for the crime of genocide appears analogous in
some ways to a suggested political ground, which would certainly
have been applicable in the case of possible exterminations by
DPRK. Although there was some evidence before the COI of
possible extermination of civilians on religious grounds, said for
example to be evidenced by the huge drop in the number of
Christian adherents in North Korea identified on the DPRK’s own
statistics, the evidence of this respect was ambiguous. It was an
insufficient foundation for a finding of genocide.61
The COI members expressed themselves as sympathetic to a
reconfiguration of the controlling definition of “genocide” in
international customary law, so that it would include political
grounds by analogy with religious grounds.62 However, the COI did
61 See Detailed Findings, supra note 1 at para. 1159 (“[T]he Commission was
not in a position to gather enough information to make a determination.”). While
there was undoubted evidence that the religiously-observant population in DPRK
had fallen from about twenty-three percent at partition of the peninsula in 1945 to
less than one percent in recent times, the COI was not convinced that it had been
proved that this was by reason of extermination of that population. It was possible
that the large decline in the Christian community in DPRK was a result of official
discouragement and propaganda rather than extermination. The COI could not be
sure and held back on a finding.
62 See Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of
the Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, AND RESULTS (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (arguing that the
COI’s approach is prudent because of the division of the international community
on the issue, demonstrated in the negotiations of the Genocide Convention and the
addition of the category of “Ethnical Group” as a means to ‘extend protection to
doubtful cases’); see also U.N. Sixth Comm., Oct. 15, 1948, UNDOC A/C, 6/SR.75
(outlining how the committee divided on that issue 18 in favour, 17 against, 11
abstentions. “Political groups” were included in the text of the draft convention
until very late in its gestation but eventually withdrawn by consensus); HIRAD
ABTAHI & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES
1412 (2008) (finding that in the creation of new crimes—including new international
crimes—an approach of restraint is justifiable, for such developments have a
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not feel obliged, or justified, to make conclusive findings on that
basis, being convinced that there was ample proof of many “crimes
against humanity.” Resolution of the issue of law involved in the
disputable definition of “genocide” was therefore unnecessary to
reach a conclusion for the COI’s report.63
As the COI emphasised, crimes against humanity, in themselves,
are so grave as to initiate the responsibility of the state concerned
(and in default the international community) to protect the actual
and potential victims and to hold the perpetrators accountable
under international law.64
One of the specific recommendations of the COI on DPRK was
that the situation in the country should be referred by the Security
Council to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Such a reference
would be necessary under the Rome Statute65 because DPRK is
(perhaps not unexpectedly) not a party to the Rome Statute and
hence is not otherwise amenable to its jurisdiction. In its report, the
COI examined various other possible ways of ensuring
accountability for the crimes against humanity that it had found
and, in respect of which, DPRK afforded no protection or redress to
its own people. Such failure would appear to enliven the
responsibility of the international community, in the case of DPRK,
to protect (Responsibility to Protect (R2P)) the people of DPRK from
consequence analogous to the imposition of retrospective criminal liability, which
international human rights law resists).
63 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1158 (emphasizing that all of the
crimes against humanity found in the DPRK are grave crimes that trigger an
international response).
64 However, what is distinctive about “genocide” is that the Genocide
Convention, recognised as a source of customary international law, imposes an
obligation on all states to prevent the relevant acts and defaults. It thus goes beyond
the obligation to protect. Arguably, it involves even more clearly the duty of
collective action for which the Security Council derives special responsibilities
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Compare Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, available at
https://www.icrc.
org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=1507EE9200C58C5EC12563F6005
FB3E5&action=openDocument (detailing methods to prevent genocide) with
Charter of the U.N. Charter ch. VII (explaining measures to be taken by the Security
Council to prevent threats to peace).
65 See Rome Statute, supra note 58, art. 13(b) (finding that the ICC would have
jurisdiction if a “situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council.”). Cf. Detailed
Findings, supra note 1, para. 1201(1) (“The Security Council could refer the situation
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the International Criminal Court
based on article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute and Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations.”).
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such crimes. All of the other options considered by the COI were,
for the reasons given in the COI report, less suitable or desirable.66
2.5. Findings
The COI produced its report on time, within budget, and
unanimously. The report was publicly released on 17 February 2014
in Geneva.67 On 17 March 2014, it was presented to the HRC in
Geneva. It there attracted a strong vote from the HRC members
(30:6:9). The COI found:
Systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations
have been and are being committed by the [DPRK], its
institutions and officials. In many instances, the violations
of human rights found by the commission constitute crimes
against humanity. These are not mere excesses of the State;
they are essential components of a political system that has
moved far from the ideals on which it claims to have been
founded. The gravity, scale and nature of these violations
reveal a State that does not have any parallel in the
contemporary world. Political scientists of the 20th century
characterized this type of political organization as a
totalitarian State: a State that does not content itself with
ensuring the authoritarian rule of a small group of people,
but seeks to dominate every aspect of its citizens’ lives and
terrorizes them from within.68
The COI made the following specific findings:
 “there is an almost complete denial of the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion, as well as of the rights to
freedom of opinion, expression, information, and
association.”69
66 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, paras. 1201–1202 (detailing the options). The
other options included (1) a peace and reconciliation process; (2) an ad hoc
international tribunal; (3) a joint national and international ad hoc tribunal; and (4)
appointment of a special prosecutor, without a designated court, to continue to
gather and evaluate evidence.
67 Id. para. 5.
68 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1211.
69 Id. para. 259.
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 The DPRK “operates an all-encompassing indoctrination
machine” commencing at an early age “to propagate an
official personality cult” and to ensure “absolute obedience to
the Supreme Leader,” effectively extinguishing independent
thought;70
 There is strict control of all social activities. Pervasive
surveillance geared at ensuring that “virtually no expression
critical of the political system or of its leadership goes
undetected. Citizens are punished for any “anti-State”
activities . . .”71
 Information is absolutely restricted to state sources and the
“monopoly [is protected] by carrying out regular crackdowns
and enforcing harsh punishments”;72
 Religious persecution against Christians is pervasive.
“Christians are prohibited from practising their religion and .
. . [those] caught practising . . . are subject to severe
punishments in violation of the right to freedom of religion
and the prohibition of religious discrimination.”73
 Discrimination that is sponsored by the state “is pervasive . .
. [and] rooted in the songbun system, which classifies people
on the basis of State-assigned social class and birth,74 and also
includes consideration of political opinions and religion.
Songbun intersects with gender-based discrimination, which
is equally pervasive. Discrimination is also practised on the
basis of disability”;
 Gender discrimination is egregious and takes many forms
including targeting for bribery: “[there are] blatantly
discriminatory restrictions on women in an attempt to
maintain the gender stereotype of the pure and innocent

70
71
72
73
74

Id. para. 260.
Detailed Findings II, supra note 38, para. 28.
Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 263.
Detailed Findings II, supra note 38, para. 31.
The COI noted that

the songbun system used to be the most important factor in determining
where individuals were allowed to live; what sort of accommodation they
had; what occupations they were assigned to; whether they were
effectively able to attend school, in particular university; how much food
they received; and even whom they might marry.
Id. para. 33.
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Korean woman. Sexual and gender-based violence against
women is prevalent throughout all areas of society.”75
 There is drastic violation of “all aspects of the right to freedom
of movement [and] the State imposes on citizens where they
must live and work, violating their freedom of choice.”76
 Citizens are banned from leaving the country and having
contact with foreigners.77 Those “found to have been in
contact with officials or nationals from the Republic of Korea
or with Christian churches may be forcibly “disappeared”
into political prison camps, imprisoned in ordinary prisons or
even summarily executed.”78
 China is in violation of “its obligation to respect the principle
of non-refoulement under international refugee and human
rights law.” by repatriating those crossing the border back to
DPRK.79
75 The COI recorded that “[d]iscrimination against women also intersects with
a number of other human rights violations, placing women in positions of
vulnerability. Violations of the rights to food and freedom of movement have
resulted in women and girls becoming vulnerable to trafficking and increased
engagement in transactional sex and prostitution.” In addition, “[w]omen
abducted from Europe, the Middle East and Asia were subjected to forced
marriages with men from other countries to prevent liaisons on their part with
ethnic Korean women that could result in interracial children. Some of the
abducted women have also been subject to sexual exploitation.” Id. paras. 36, 67.
76 Id. paras. 38–39.
77 Detailed Findings, supra note 1 para. 1104

(Border guards remain authorized to shoot to kill persons who cross the
DPRK border without permission. Such killings amount to murder. They
cannot be justified as legitimate border control measures, because they
serve to uphold a de facto total travel ban on ordinary citizens that violates
international law. Furthermore, the intentional taking of life for purposes
of preventing the unauthorized crossing of a border is grossly
disproportionate.)
78 Detailed Findings, supra note 1 para. 489. The COI also finds that “severe
impediments put in place by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to prevent
contact and communication with family members in the Republic of Korea are a
breach of the State’s obligations under international human rights law. The
restrictions are arbitrary, cruel and inhuman.”
79 Detailed Findings II, supra note 38, para. 43. This practice adopted by China
under the plea that these people are economic migrants has horrific effects on
women and children. As the COI points out,

Many women are trafficked by force or deception from the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea into or within China for the purposes of
exploitation in forced marriage or concubinage, or prostitution under
coercive circumstances. An estimated 20,000 children born to women from
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are currently in China. These
children are deprived of their rights to birth registration, nationality,
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 The DPRK “has used food as a means of control over the
population . . . it [confiscates] food from those in need . . . [and
provides it] to other groups. The State has practised
discrimination with regard to access to and distribution of
food based on the songbun system.”80
 There is “evidence of systematic, widespread and grave
violations of the right to food81 . . . decisions, actions and
omissions by the State and its leadership caused the death of
at least hundreds of thousands of people and inflicted
permanent physical and psychological injuries on those who
survived.”82 The consequences were particularly grave for
children.83 Crucially, the state was responsible for breaching
education and health care because their birth cannot be registered without
exposing the mother to the risk of refoulement by China.
Id. para. 44.
80 Detailed Findings, supra note 1 para. 683. The COI made a finding that
during periods of “mass starvation, the [DPRK] impeded the delivery of food aid
by imposing conditions that were not based on humanitarian considerations.
International humanitarian agencies were subject to restrictions contravening
humanitarian principles.” Id. para. 687. In addition, “deliberate starvation [is used]
as a means of control and punishment in detention facilities. This has resulted in
the deaths of many political and ordinary prisoners.” Id. para. 689.
81 Washington Public Hearing, 30 October 2013 (00:45:19); Detailed Findings,
supra note 1 para. 516,
When my younger brother was born . . . my grandmother actually wanted
to kill [him] because my mom was very undernourished and she was not
able to lactate. [My mother] begged my grandmother saying, ‘Please do
not kill the baby.’ . . . I had to take care of this baby brother. So I was
piggybacking him around the town and sometimes my grandmother had
to carry him around to make him stop crying. But as I mentioned, because
there was no food, he was not able to stop crying. . . [My] baby brother
died in my arms because he was not able to eat. And because I was holding
him so much, he thought I was his mom. So when I was feeding him water,
he was sometimes looking at me smiling at me.
82

Id.

Commission finds that there was awareness about the famine situation all
the way up to the Supreme Leader. Former officials stated that the
provinces submitted detailed reports about the situation to the capital.
Kim Jong-il also visited numerous locations in the country as part of his
“military first” and “on-the-spot guidance” visits. On these occasions, he
could not have missed what was happening in the country.
83

Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 545.

Between 2003 and 2008, 45 per cent of children under five in the DPRK
were stunted. For the same age group, nine per cent were suffering from
wasting and seven per cent were severely underweight. The most recent
UNICEF-financed nutritional survey concluded that 27.9 per cent of the
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international legal obligations in relation to the right to food.84
The COI found that “deliberately providing misleading
information to international humanitarian actors or
preventing international food aid from reaching starving
populations can constitute extermination, if mass deaths
occur” and because the authorities knew that their decisions
aggravated mass deaths, their “level of criminal intent is
sufficient for the crime of extermination.”85
 The regime is kept alive by “police and security forces . . .
systematically employ[ing] violence and punishments that
amount to gross human rights violations”;86
 Specifically, political prisoners are arbitrary arrested and
detained indefinitely by the State Security Department, the

country’s two year olds are afflicted by stunting and 8.4 per cent of all
children in that age group are severely stunted.
The COI also noted the dire impacts on women: “women in the DPRK, particularly
mothers in the family, have experienced severe deterioration in their health, largely
because they either skipped or reduced portions of their meals for the benefit of
other family members.” Id. para 560.
84 One of the obligations identified by the COI was Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR,
which states that
each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in
the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the
adoption of legislative measures. (emphasis supplied by the COI).
Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 637. The COI found that “the allocation of
resources by the DPRK has grossly failed to prioritize the objective of freeing people
from hunger and chronic malnutrition, in particular in times of mass starvation.”
Id. para 639. Other obligations include a right to “Freedom from hunger” which
“lies at the conjunction of the right to adequate food (article 11 (2) of the ICESCR)
and the right to life (article 6 of the ICCPR).” Id. para 665. The COI found that
“decisions, actions and omissions by the DPRK and its leadership have generated
and aggravated this situation. They have caused at least hundreds of thousands of
human beings to perish.” Id. para 674; That “the DPRK has been responsible for the
deliberate starvation of people detained for interrogation purposes as well as those
imprisoned in political prison camps and the ordinary prison system.” Id. para 681;
and that “decisions, actions and omissions by the state and its leadership have
caused the death of at the very least hundreds of thousands of human beings and
inflicted permanent physical and psychological injury including intergenerational
harm, on those who survived.” Id. para. 690.
85 Id. paras. 1121-22.
86 Id. para. 838.
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Ministry of People’s Security and the Korean People’s Army
Military Security Command;87
Torture is regularly employed in interrogations and
“[s]tarvation and other inhumane conditions of detention are
deliberately imposed on suspects to increase the pressure on
them to confess and to incriminate other persons”;88
Those convicted of committing major political offenses are
“disappeared” without trial or judicial order, to political
prison camps (kwanliso).89
The forced disappearances are not confined to DPRK citizens:
“over 200,000 persons, including children, who were brought
from other countries to the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea may have become victims of enforced disappearance,
as defined in the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance.”90
The COI estimated that “hundreds of thousands of political
prisoners have perished in these camps over the past five

87 The COI applied the legal framework provided by “article 6 (the right to
life), article 7 (freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment),
article 9 (right to liberty and security of the person), article 10 (humane treatment
of detainees), and article 14 (right to a fair trial) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).” The COI found that “Courts appear not to ever
be involved in the decision to send a person to a political prison camp. This
exclusion violates not only international law, but also article 127 of the DPRK Code
of Criminal Procedure Code.” Id. At para 721. Further, “non-judicial prison
“sentences” violate the suspect’s right to a fair and public hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law, which is established by
article 14 of the ICCPR.” Id. para 727.
88 The COI report details Mr Jeong’s ‘pigeon torture’.

[Y]our hands are handcuffed behind your back. And then they hang you
so you would not be able to stand or sit . . . There are no people watching
you. There is nobody. And you can’t stand, you can’t sleep. If you are
hung like that for three days, four days, you urinate, you defecate, you are
totally dehydrated. . . . [the pigeon torture] was the most painful of all
tortures . . . [it] was so painful that I felt it was better to die.
Seoul Public Hearing, 21 August 2013, morning (02:09:00); Detailed Findings, supra
note 1, para. 715.
89 Detailed Findings, para. 793.
In the kwanliso, the inmates are no longer registered citizens, so you do
not need a law to decide the sentences. The bowibu [SSD] agent is the
person who decides whether you are saved or you are executed. There
are no other criteria other than his words. [The inmates] are already
eliminated from society.
Seoul Public Hearing, 21 August 2013, afternoon (00:58:40).
90 Detailed Findings, para. 1011.
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decades. The unspeakable atrocities that are being committed
against inmates of the kwanliso political prison camps
resemble the horrors of camps that totalitarian States
established during the twentieth century.”91
 The denials about the camps by the DPRK are contradicted by
satellite imagery and it is “estimated that between 80,000 and
120,000 political prisoners are currently detained in four large
political prison camps”;92
 Prisoners are executed “with or without trial;, publicly or
secretly, in response to political and other crimes that are
often not among the most serious crimes.” The regime
apparently employs public executions as a means to “instil
fear in the general population,”93 and various state
institutions were responsible.94
91 Id. para. 842. The COI found that the atrocities were not limited to those
convicted of major crimes:

Prisoners in the ordinary prison system are systematically subjected to
deliberate starvation and illegal forced labour. Torture, rape and other
arbitrary cruelties at the hands of guards and fellow prisoners are
widespread and committed with impunity . . . Once you are in there, not
a lot of people make it out. Once you are in the solitary cell, you are beaten
up and they give you 30 grams per meal and you get cold, so that leads to
an immediate weakness. Somebody who weighs 50 kilograms [when they
go in], their weight is reduced to 20 kilograms [when they exit solitary
confinement].
Seoul Public Hearing, 21 August 2013, morning (01:48:10).
92 Id. para. 1062.
93 Id. para. 845. The COI found that
a large number of executions are carried out in places of detention in the
DPRK. In some cases, the execution is based on a judicial sentence. In other
cases, summary execution is imposed without any known trial or judicial
order, apparently to uphold discipline and institutional rules. . . . Inmates
of political and ordinary prison camps are particularly vulnerable to secret
executions. . . . The killing of prisoners can also be easily concealed because
the bodies of prison camp inmates are never returned to their family. The
Commission received credible first-hand information about instances of
secret summary executions carried out in prison camps and interrogation
detention facilities.
Id. paras 834-35.
94 Detailed Findings, supra note 1 at para 839.
“Gross human rights violations . . . in respect of detention, execution and
disappearances are characterized by a high degree of centralized
coordination between different parts of the extensive security apparatus.
The State Security Department, Ministry of People’s Security and the
Korean People’s Army Military Security Command regularly subject
persons accused of political crimes to arbitrary arrest. This falls short of
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 Crucially, “operations [involving disappearances] were
approved at the level of the Supreme Leader.”95 The
disappearances appear to be motivated by the desire to “gain
labour and other skills for the State.” In some instances, there
were to “further espionage and terrorist activities.”96
 The COI found that “from 1950 until the present, the DPRK
has engaged in the systematic abduction, denial of
repatriation and subsequent enforced disappearance of
persons from other countries on a large scale and as a matter
of State policy. Well over 200,000 persons who were taken
from other countries to the DPRK may have potentially
become victims of enforced disappearance, as defined in the
Declaration for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance.”97 International abductions continue to
present date and “[since] the 1990s, its agents have abducted
a number of persons from Chinese territory, including

the legal requirements set out by international law and even under the
[DPRK’s] own laws.”
With regard to legal responsibility, the COI found that
various decisions and policies of the DPRK leadership . . . entail crimes of
murder as defined in international criminal law, because the responsible
officials aggravated starvation in full awareness that this would cause
more deaths in the ordinary course of events. . . . most of the public
executions carried out in response to economic crimes for survival during
the famine amounted to murder, as defined by international criminal law.
Id. paras 1128-29.
95 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, at para 835: “secret executions could be
linked to a directive that was allegedly issued by Kim Jong-il in 1997 and instructed
the security apparatus to eliminate all elements who are “diseased in mind”.
Further, the COI
has received information directly indicating that the camp system is
controlled from the highest level of the state. In some cases, the
Commission was able to trace orders to cause the disappearance of
individuals to the camps to the level of the Supreme Leader. Moreover,
the State Security Department, which decides whether to send individuals
to the camp, is subject to the directions and close oversight of the Supreme
Leader.
Id. para 1065.
96 Id. para. 853. The COI noted that “family members abroad and foreign States
wishing to exercise their right to provide diplomatic protection have been
consistently denied information necessary to establish the fate and whereabouts of
the victims. Family members of the disappeared have been subjected to torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.” Id. para. 1019.
97 Id. para 1011.
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nationals of China, the Republic of Korea and, in at least one
case, a former Japanese national.”98
 Of special import, the COI found that “the body of testimony
and other information it received establishes that crimes
against humanity have been committed in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, pursuant to policies established
at the highest level of the State.”99
 The COI also established that these crimes including
“extermination,
murder,
enslavement,
torture,
imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other sexual
violence, persecution on political, religious, racial and gender
grounds,” the forcible transfer of populations, the enforced
disappearance of persons, and the inhumane act of
knowingly causing prolonged starvation” are ongoing.100
Specifically, the COI determined that “crimes against humanity
have been committed against starving populations, particularly
during the 1990s . . . from decisions and policies violating the right
to food, which were applied for the purposes of sustaining the
present political system, in full awareness that such decisions would
exacerbate starvation and related deaths” of much of the
population.101
98 Id. para. 1020. The COI observed that “human rights violations continue
against them and their families. The shock and pain caused by such actions is
indescribable.” Id. para. 1021.
99 Id. para. 1160. The COI found that “that DPRK authorities have committed
and are committing crimes against humanity in the political prison camps,
including extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape and
other grave sexual violence and persecution on political, religious and gender
grounds.” Id. para 1033.
Further,

inmates of political prison camps are victims of the crime of
imprisonment. Inmates are imprisoned, usually for life, in camps without
ever having been brought before a judge in accordance with article 9 (3)
and (4) of the ICCPR. . . . inmates of the DPRK’s political prison camps are
victims of the crime of enforced disappearance. . . . living conditions in
the political prison camps are calculated to bring about mass deaths. . . .
intentional killings of individual inmates in the DPRK’s political prison
camps, through summary executions, beatings, infanticide, deliberate
starvation and other illegal means, all amount to the crime of murder. . . .
inmates in the DPRK’s political prison camps are generally victims of the
crime of persecution.
Id. paras. 1039, 1043, 1047, 1058.
100 Id. paras. 1028-76.
101 Id. para. 1162.
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Having made these chilling findings, the COI issued a set of
recommendations. Perhaps the most significant in terms of actual
executability is a call for the UN to ensure “that those most
responsible for the crimes against humanity committed . . . are held
accountable.”102 The COI suggested that the UNSC could refer the
situation to the International Criminal Court or the UN set up an ad
hoc tribunal.103 The COI made a number of other recommendations
that might be termed aspirational in terms of the prospect of
actualisation in the near term.104 These included a demand to
provide access to political prisoners and their immediate release,
institute “political and institutional reforms . . . to introduce genuine
checks and balances upon the powers of the Supreme Leader and
the Workers’ Party of Korea,” creation of an independent and
impartial judiciary, a “multiparty political system and elected
people’s assemblies at the local and central levels that emerge from
genuinely free and fair elections,” establishment of an “independent
constitutional and institutional reform commission,” and
“acknowledge[ment of] the existence of human rights violations,
including the political prison camps.”105 Legal reforms such as
abolishment of “vaguely worded ‘anti-State’ and ‘anti-People’
102 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1218. (The COI also made the
following sobering call for responsibility:

The international community must accept its responsibility to protect the
people of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from crimes against
humanity, because the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea has manifestly failed to do so. In particular, this responsibility
must be accepted in the light of the role played by the international
community (and by the great powers in particular) in the division of the
Korean peninsula and because of the unresolved legacy of the Korean
War.)
103 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1219 (The COI also recommended that
this be combined with a “reinforced human rights dialogue, the promotion of
incremental change through more people-to-people contact and an inter-Korean
agenda for reconciliation.”)
104 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1211-25. (In this category was a
recommendation to

Prosecute and bring to justice those persons most responsible for alleged
crimes against humanity; appoint a special prosecutor to supervise this
process; ensure that victims and their families are provided with adequate,
prompt and effective reparation and remedies, including by knowing the
truth about the violations that have been suffered; launch a people-driven
process to establish the truth about the violations; provide adults and
children with comprehensive education on national and international law
and practice on human rights and democratic governance.)
105

Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1220.
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crimes” in the criminal code, the creation of a guarantee of the “right
to a fair trial and due process . . . articulated in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” enforcement of the
prohibitions and criminalization of “torture and other inhuman
means of interrogation that are illegal under international law,” and
the guarantee of “humane conditions of detention for all inmates
deprived of liberty” within the prison system were also
recommended.106 On the social front, the COI recommended that the
DPRK adopt a “moratorium on the imposition and execution of the
death penalty, followed without undue delay by the abolition of the
death penalty,” create the conditions for the operation of a free
press, access to “the Internet, social media, international
communications, foreign broadcasts and publications, including the
popular culture of other countries,” commence “education to ensure
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,” terminate
“propaganda or educational activities that espouse national, racial
or political hatred,” and “[e]nd discrimination against citizens on
the basis of their perceived political loyalty or the sociopolitical
background of their families.”107 It also called on the state to “[a]llow
Christians and other religious believers to exercise their religion
independently and publicly, without fear of punishment, reprisal or
surveillance.”108 In response to the egregious violations of gender
equality, the COI recommended that the DPRK undertake a series
of practical measures.109 The COI also addressed recommendations
to China. Specifically, it asked that China “[r]espect the principle of
non-refoulement and . . . abstain from forcibly repatriating any
persons to [DPRK] . . . extend asylum and other means of durable
protection to persons fleeing the [DPRK] who need international
protection.”110 Crucially, the COI asked China to “[t]ake immediate
measures to prevent agents of [DPRK] from carrying out further
abductions from Chinese territory; prosecute and adequately
punish apprehended perpetrators of abduction and demand the

Id.
Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. (explaining that these recommendations included “providing equal
access for women in public life and employment; eradicate discriminatory laws,
regulations and practices affecting women; take measures to address all forms of
violence against women, including domestic violence, sexual and gender-based
violence by State agents and/or within State institutions.”)
110 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1220.
106
107
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extradition of those giving such orders so that they may be tried in
accordance with law.”111
The COI called on the UN, specifically the SC, to “refer the
situation in [DPRK] to the International Criminal Court for action in
accordance with that court’s jurisdiction.”112 It asked the SC to
“adopt targeted sanctions against those who appear to be most
responsible for crimes against humanity.”113
2.6. Aftermath of the COI Report
The COI report was transmitted by the HRC to the UN General
Assembly (“GA”). A resolution, sponsored by the EU and Japan,
called for action on the report and GA referral to the Security
Council. A procedural resolution by Cuba to delete references to
any such action, in the light of suggested new levels of cooperation
from DPRK, was defeated (40:77:50). Subsequently, the Third
Committee of the GA endorsed the EU-Japan resolution
(111:19:55).114 The plenary GA adopted the resolution (116:20:55).
Following this, France, joined by the United States and Australia
co-sponsors, initiated the Arria arrangement in the Security Council
on April 17, 2014. It provided the facility of a briefing to members
of the Security Council, as well as a concurrent briefing on the
preceding day to members of the General Assembly. This procedure
111
112
113

Id.
Id.
Id. (Stating

In the light of the dire social and economic situation of the general
population, the commission does not support sanctions imposed by the
Security Council or introduced bilaterally that are targeted against the
population or the economy as a whole.”). The COI was acutely conscious
of the pernicious side effects of sanctions on innocent people in a country
beset by starvation: “States should not use the provision of food and other
essential humanitarian assistance to impose economic or political pressure
on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Humanitarian assistance
should be provided in accordance with humanitarian and human rights
principles, including the principle of non-discrimination. Aid should only
be curbed to the extent that unimpeded international humanitarian access
and related monitoring is not adequately guaranteed.
Id. at 21.
114 Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, G.A. Res. 25/25, UN GAOR, 3rd
Comm’n, 69th Sess, 46th Mtg, Agenda Item 68 (c), Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/69/53,
2 (Mar. 28, 2014) (endorsing the EU-Japan resolution).
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indicates both the increasing concern of the international
community about gross violations of human rights in North Korea
and the need for a response to the high media coverage of the COI
report. All members of the Security Council save China and the
Russian Federation attended. Of the thirteen Security Council
member states present at the Arria briefing, eleven intervened to
address the issues. None of them spoke adversely about the report
or its conclusions or recommendations. Of the eleven that spoke,
nine expressed themselves in favor of a key recommendation
included in the COI report and addressed specifically to the Security
Council. This was the recommendation that the Security Council
should “refer the situation in the [DPRK] to the International
Criminal Court for action in accordance with that Court’s
jurisdiction.”
Neither in the Arria briefing of the Security Council members
nor earlier in the HRC was there any criticism of particular findings
or conclusions of the COI. No factual finding was contested, other
than by the generic denunciation of the COI by the representative of
DPRK after the COI report was presented to the Council.
Following the conclusion of the Arria briefing and the many
strong statements calling for action, both on the part of members of
the Security Council and on the part of other members of the United
Nations present as observers, a “non-paper” dated July 11, 2014 was
addressed by the permanent representatives of Australia, France,
and the United States to the President of the Security Council.115
This letter reported on the co-hosting of the meeting of Security
Council members under the Arria formula on April 17, 2014 “to
discuss the [COI] report.”116 The document concludes with a
statement that the Security Council members had congratulated the
COI for the “compelling report of exceptional quality” and had
115 Letter from the Permanent Reps. of Australia, France and the U.S. to the
United Nations to the President of the Security Council (July 11, 2014). Recording
the co-convenors’ summary of the comments made by participants during the Arria
meetings, the document insists that it “does not prejudge endorsement of their
content by Australia, France, the United States or any other Member State;” but that
it is provided “for further consideration.” Id. at 2.
116 Id. at 1.

We believe that the Security Council should formally discuss the
commission’s findings of widespread and systematic human rights
violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its
recommendations to the Council, and consider appropriate action. In
particular, the Council should consider how those responsible for such
violations should be held accountable.
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“commended the courage of the two witnesses.”117 Council
members “expressed grave concern at the horrific human rights
violations and crimes against humanity outlined in the report”.118
Most members of the Council “urged [DPRK] to comply with the
Commission’s recommendations and to engage with the [UN]
human rights system, including at its forthcoming universal
periodic review”.119 As recorded in the “non-paper,” it was noted
that “[s]everal non-Council members also voiced support for the
aforementioned accountability efforts”.120
In early December 2014, upon the request of three members of
the Security Council (Australia, France and the United States of
America), the Security Council President convened a meeting of the
Security Council in response to the COI report. Prior notice of a
procedural motion placing issues of human rights in DPRK on the
agenda of the Security Council was given by ten Security Council
members. This indicated the existence already of a two-thirds
majority, as required by art. 27.2 of the UN Charter for decision of
the Security Council on a procedural matter. On 22 December 2014,
the Security Council decided to place the issues of human rights in
DPRK on its agenda for ongoing attention. This decision was
adopted by a strong vote (11:2:2).121 On a show of hands, the only
votes against the procedural resolution were those of China and the
Russian Federation.
Following the COI’s public hearings, publicity and subsequent
report, DPRK, for the first time, engaged to some degree with the
UN human rights system. It participated in the UPR of its human
rights record; it produced its own—albeit unpersuasive and

117 Id. at 4. (Listing among the key findings of the COI in the non-paper are
references to: 1. the estimated 80,000 to 120,000 people imprisoned without trial in
four large prison camps in the DPRK and others languishing in other prisons and
interrogation centres where torture is a standard practice; 2. the forced repatriation
of women who have tried to flee DPRK and their subjection to sexual humiliation
and violence, as found by the COI; 3. the attempt of authorities in DPRK to control
the minds of the population by indoctrination and violent suppressions of freedom
of thought or opinion; and 4. the instances of cases of abduction and forced
disappearance of well over 200,000 persons from China, Japan, ROK and other
counties.)
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 U.N. S.C. 7353d mtg. U.N. Doc. S/PV.7353, (Dec. 22, 2014) (detailing
speeches given by members of the Council on the situation in DPRK).
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propagandistic—human rights report;122 and it promised dialogue
with the EU, the Special Rapporteur, and others on human rights
matters, which was subsequently withdrawn.123
The report of the COI on DPRK “reveals the unique and
dangerous conditions prevailing in the DPRK that do not have any
The question now
parallel in the contemporary world.”124
confronting the global community and the United Nations as its
representative body is whether sufficient resolution and principle
can be found to take the steps that are necessary to protect universal
human rights in DPRK and to render accountable, quickly and
effectively, those who have breached, and continue to breach, those
rights. The report of the COI on DPRK has been prepared in the
hope and conviction that the answer to those questions is in the
affirmative.
3.

RECALCITRANT STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

3.1. Is The Outlaw/Rogue Label Analytically Useful?
The term “outlaw state” or “rogue state” has gained currency in
modern reportage about international relations. 125 This is largely
122 Report of the DPRK Centre for Human Rights Studies, KOREA CENTRAL NEWS
AGENCY, Sept. 13, 2014, available at http://www.ncnk.org/Report_of_the_DPRK_
Association_for_Human_Rights_Studies.pdf (documenting the current state of
human rights in DPRK). Note that this source was originally published on the
Korean Central News Agency website (www.kcna.kp), although no permanent url
exists for the report on that site.
123 North Korea says it has invited European Union human rights official to visit,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST Oct. 31, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/
article/1628934/north-korea-says-it-has-invited-european-union-human-rightsofficial-visit (noting that the DPKR invited the EU’s top human rights official to
visit and threatening to rescind invitations to visit previously issued to UN officials
unless references to the International Criminal Court were dropped from the UN
resolution on the country).
124 Detailed Findings, supra note 1, para. 1211.
125 See MIROSLAV NINCIC, RENEGADE REGIMES: CONFRONTING DEVIANT BEHAVIOR
IN WORLD POLITICS 18 (2007) (observing that “renegade regimes are deviant
members of the international community, norm breaking is their key defining
feature . . . ”). See also IAN CLARK, LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 563, 566
(2005)

there are now two categories of outlaw states: ‘behavioural outlaws’, who
violate norms, and ‘ontological outlaws’, who are outlaws ‘more for who
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owed to the employment of the terms by the United States in its
post-Cold War foreign policy.126 After recounting its early origins,
Litwak elaborates that the modern concept of rogue state developed
under Reagan. The focus was on labeling states as outlaws if they
supported terrorism aimed at the United States. Following the
conclusion of the Cold War, the acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction (“WMD”) by states inimical to the United States caused
those states to be labelled as rogue states.127 Therefore, for Litwak,
the label has everything to do with preservation of American
preferences in international relations.128 On the other hand, John
Rawls uses the term in a normative sense in his work Law of Peoples.
He notes, “[t]he liberal and decent peoples' acceptance of the law of
peoples is not sufficient—the society of peoples need to develop new
institutions and practices to constrain outlaw states when they
appear . . . among these practices should be the promotion of human
rights.”129
It must be recognized that despite the term’s currency and
popular appeal, a state does not become an outlaw or a rogue
following any formal legal procedure that is derived from treaties or
other international law commitments. This is in sharp distinction
with domestic law outlaws—which is supposedly the basis for the
analogical extension of the term into international relations. In the
former, an individual is assessed typically through a formal legal
proceeding to have violated precise legal obligations and found to
be guilty. In the latter, the reality of international relations belies the

they are than what they have done’. In its recent deployments, democracy
has been used to foster the category of ‘ontological outlaws’, those found
deficient for what they are rather than for what they have done.
126 See ROBERT S. LITWAK, ROGUE STATES AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY:
CONTAINMENT AFTER THE COLD WAR 56 –57 (2000) (describing the emergence of the
term “rogue status” at the end of the Cold War).
127 Id. at 52 –54 (describing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction as
“the second key criterion” for labelling a state as “rouge” or “outlaw.”).
128 Id. at 47-8 (discussing the United States’ use of the rogue state policy to
promote American interests and giving examples of the political motivation behind
the act of labelling of specific states as “rogue”).
129 JOHN RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES 48 (1999). See also id. at 90

There are two kinds of non-ideal theory. One kind deals with conditions
of non-compliance in which certain regimes refuse to comply with a
reasonable Law of Peoples; these regimes think that a sufficient reason to
engage in war is that it advances the regime's rational (not reasonable)
interests. These regimes I call outlaw states.
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existence of such orderly proceedings that are binding and capable
of assessing the guilt of states.
Therefore, the term “rogue” or “outlaw” as it is applied to states
in international law is not a coherent concept. It is politicised,
idiosyncratic, and not accurately descriptive in a legal sense.
However, that is not to deny its utility.
3.2. The Objectives of Labelling
Regardless of whether one chooses to employ the term “rogue,”
“deviant,” or “outlaw” in reference to a problematic state, it is
inescapable that the labels all proceed from a precondition—that the
state has violated a set of norms shared by states within that normcommunity. Due to the enormous variations between nation states
along social, religious, political, and economic lines, it is worth
asking whether there is a degree of shared normative commitment
that justifies the imposition of labels like rogue, deviant, and outlaw.
Analysis suggests that despite the above variations, modern states
share religious,130 ethnic, gender,131 economic, linguistic, and
technological bonds that give rise to common commitments
embodied in international norms.132 For instance, most nation states
130 See Jeff Hynes, Transnational Religious Actors and International Politics, 22
THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 143, 143—58 (2001) (examining the tie between
transnational religious actors and state sovereignty).
131 The women’s movement transcends national boundaries in its campaigns
for issues affecting women around the world. The UN Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women is one manifestation of
a legal framework for this community. See generally G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc
A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979) (establishing an international treaty aimed at
eliminating discrimination against women ); VALENTINE M. MOGHADAM,
GLOBALIZING WOMEN (2005) (examining how the positive and negative aspects of
globalization have helped to create transnational networks of feminist activists and
organizations with shared agendas); TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
GLOBAL POLITICS (Jackie Smith et al. eds., 1997) (examining transnational social
movements from the lens of actors traditionally excluded from the study of global
politics); GLOBAL FEMINISM: TRANSNATIONAL WOMEN’S ACTIVISM, ORGANIZING, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (Myra M. Ferree & Aili M. Tripp eds., 2006) (exploring the social
and political developments that have led the movement for women’s recognition
as full persons).
132 Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992) (defining an epistemic community as a
“network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that
domain or issue-area”).
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have made a legal commitment to the condemnation of torture,133
slavery,134 piracy,135 genocide,136 prostitution,137 and narcotic
drugs.138 This is evidenced by their participation in the drafting and
ratification of international law instruments on these subjects and
both subsequent statements and conduct, which, although not
exemplars of perfect compliance, exert substantial constraints on
contraventions. In addition to legal texts on these topics, there is a
community of shared overarching norms constituted by the
adoption of obligations associated with the membership of
international organisations such as the United Nations.139

133 See generally U.N. Convention against Torture, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) (placing an absolute prohibition on torture and imposing

obligations on parties to prevent it from occurring).
134 See generally Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25,

1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253 (defining “slavery” and “slave trade”); Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7 1956 (advancing the goals of the 1926
Convention); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (setting forth the basic human right to liberty).
135 See generally Convention on the High Seas art. 100, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 (stating “[a]ll States shall cooperate to the fullest possible
extent in the repression of piracy . . . ”).
136 See generally Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (noting that “genocide, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime . . . ”).
137 See generally Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and
of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, G.A. Res. 317(IV), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/4/317 (Dec. 2, 1949) (requiring punishment for those who promote human
trafficking).
138 See generally U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 82/16, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1988)
(establishing international drug trafficking offenses); Protocol amending the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3444 (Dec. 9, 1975) (inviting
governments and the Secretary-General to support the International Narcotics
Control Board); Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Aug. 16, 1976, 1019
U.N.T.S. 175 (establishing an international control system for psychotropic
substances); Convention on the Suppression of the Trade in and use of Prepared
Opium, Feb. 11, 1925, 51 L.N.T.S. 337 (regulating the trading and international uses
of opium); International Opium Convention, Feb. 19, 1925, 81 L.N.T.S 319;
Convention on Raw Opium and Other Narcotics, Jan. 23, 1925 (introducing a
regulatory system to be controlled by an Opium Board); andHague International
Convention on Opium, Jan. 23, 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187 (allowing states to use powers
to regulate the opium trade).
139 See Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the
International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. at 529 (1998) (arguing that the
Charter of the United Nations represents the constitution of the international
community).
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The international community with shared norms seeks
objectives that are analogous to those sought to be achieved by
national communities in their reaction to norm violators. In the
domestic context this is most powerfully illustrated by the
deployment of criminal law to achieve “deterrence, incapacitation,
just punishment, and rehabilitation.”140 The first can be divided up
into general deterrence and specific deterrence. General deterrence
is aimed at establishing a calculus whereby any potential offender
has to trade off the benefits from committing a crime against its
expected costs, which are established at high levels in order to
ensure that the costs outweigh the benefits.141 General deterrence is
aimed at the whole community, not just prospective or actual
offenders. Studies about the effectiveness of deterrence in the
domestic context show that in the absence of the threat of any
punishment for criminal conduct, the social fabric of society would
readily dissipate because crime would escalate and overwhelmingly
frustrate the capacity of people to lead fulfilled lives. Thus, general
deterrence works in the sense that there is a connection between the
existence of some form of criminal punishment and criminal
conduct. In contrast, specific deterrence aims to discourage crime
by punishing individual offenders for their transgressions and,
thereby, convincing them that crime does not pay.142 This is
achieved by seeking to deter offenders from reoffending by
inflicting imprisonment or other punishment that is costly, with the

140

(2013).

U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, 2

141 See generally Dieter Dölling et al., Is Deterrence Effective? Results of MetaAnalysis of Punishment, 15 EUR. J. CRIM. POL’Y RES. 201 (2009) (studying the effect of
general deterrence on different crimes); Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime
Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON.
PERSP. 163, 177-78 (2004) (linking reduction in crime to the increased threat of
punishment); Richard Berk, New Claims about Executions and General Deterrence: Déjà
Vu All Over Again? 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303, 328 (2005) (examining the
deterrent value of capital punishment); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH
OF THE INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 90 (2014) (examining the literature on the premise that harsher
punishments have significant deterrent effects.).
141 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF THE INCARCERATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: EXPLORING THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 68 (2014) (discussing the
theory of general deterrence).
142 See generally Daniel S Nagin, Francis T. Cullen and Cheryl L. Jonson,
Imprisonment & Re-offending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115 (2008) (examining the effects of
specific deterrence on prison rates).
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goal of persuading them to avoid the unpleasant experience in the
future.143
Rehabilitation is aimed at reforming the offender.
The
underlying premise is a recognition that offending behaviour is
generated from a complex mix of social, economic, and familial
factors and that offenders can be persuaded to reform their ways
and become law-abiding citizens. Under this model, harsh
punishments and lengthy prison terms are ill-suited to persuasion
and reformation. In contrast, incapacitation seeks to remove the
offender from society and prevent him from committing other
offences during the time of punishment. In addition to the
traditional deprivation of liberty through imprisonment, less crude
forms of incapacitation include the termination of professional
licenses, bans, and other forms of immobilisation of the offender
from situations where he is likely to offend. Needless to say,
incapacitation is only effective if the offender would have reoffended during the term of the prison sentence. Further,
incapacitation is a blunt tool; it does not pay to imprison offenders
in order to prevent them from committing minor or trivial offenses
when the cost of imprisonment exceeds the damage caused by their
crimes. There are no established models for determining with a high
degree of accuracy offenders who will re-offend. In addition,
research has demonstrated that incarceration might have
‘criminogenic’ effects.144 Lower level offenders interact with more
serious criminals in prison and tend to commit more serious crimes
upon release. To be sure, there are complex reasons for this
phenomenon, including socialization into a criminal culture,
diminishment of lawful employment opportunities upon
conviction, deterioration of relationships, and negative mental wellbeing.145
143 See generally Mirko Bagaric &Theo Alexander, The Capacity of Criminal
Sanctions to Shape the Behaviour of Offenders: Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work,
Rehabilitation Might and the Implications for Sentencing, 36 CRIM. L. J. 159 (2012)
(studying empirical data on whether specific deterrence achieves sentencing goals).
144 See Lynne M. Vieraitis et al., The Criminogenic Effects of Imprisonment:
Evidence from State Panel Data, 1974–2002, 6 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 589, 593 (2007)
(defining the “criminogenic” effect as the “direct and positive impact [of prison
release] on crime if prisoners commit more crimes than they would have had they
not gone to prison.”).
145 See Christy Visher, Jennifer Yahner, and Nancy G. La Vigne, Urban Inst.,
Life After Prison: Tracking the Experiences of Male Prisoners Returning to Chicago,
Cleveland, and Houston, URBAN INSTITUTE (May 27, 2010), available at
http://urbn.is/1ySLXk4 (finding many men after prison “struggled with extensive
criminal and substance use histories, and significant shares returned to crime (17
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Finally, the community seeks to achieve the goal of retribution
in meting out punishment for norm violations. In its most primitive
form, retribution is based on the idea of the lex talionis—an eye for
an eye. The goal is to exact vengeance on the offender in proportion
to the harm he has caused to the victim.
Applying the above to international law, it is clear that
incapacitation is an expensive option, as it requires the use of
military force. Specific and general deterrence may also call for
military force in order to be effective, except to the extent that similar
results could be achieved at lower cost through the employment of
other options such as economic sanctions and shaming. In this
context, the employment of labels like outlaw, rogue, and deviant
might be aimed at achieving the objectives of deterrence by shaming
the state alleged to have violated international norms. Similarly, the
international community might attempt rehabilitation by educating
and persuading the violator to change its behavior after shaming.
Shaming is “the process by which citizens publicly and selfconsciously draw attention to the bad dispositions or actions of an
offender, as a way of punishing him for having those dispositions or
engaging in those actions.”146 In the criminal law context, shaming
can take the form of publication of the identities of patrons of
prostitutes in the media,147 to mandating specifically negative
license plates for those convicted of driving under the influence of
alcohol or drugs.148 In some instances, courts have used shaming as
part of the sentencing process.149 Critically, deterrence is key to
percent, self-reported), substance use (27 percent), and prison (22 percent, official)
within 7 to 12 months of release.”).
146 Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals—A Proposal
for Reform to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 U. Chi. J.L. & Econ., 365, 368 (1999)
(looking at shaming in the context of white-collar criminals).
147 See Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV., 733, 735 (1998) (suggesting how shaming offers an alternative to traditional
forms of punishment); see also Courtney Guyton Persons, Sex in the Sunlight: The
Effectiveness, Efficiency, Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and
Pictures of Prostitutes’ Patrons 49 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1527 (1996) (discussing the nonfinancial policy implications of shaming prostitute’s patrons).
148 See Donna DiGiovanni, The Bumper Sticker: The Innovation That Failed, 22
NEW ENG. L. REV., 643, 644 (1988) (referencing the trial court’s decision in
Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
149 Shaming has been employed in U.S. courts various times. See United States
v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 599 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring a convict to wear a
signboard proclaiming his guilt); United States v. Coenen, 135 F.3d 938, 939 (5th Cir.
1998) (requiring the defendant to publish notice in the official journal of the parish);
United States v. Schechter, 13 F.3d 1117, 1118 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring the defendant
to notify all future employers of the defendant’s past tax offenses); People v.
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shaming because the objective is to show other members of the
community that offending can be costly.150 Shaming might also
serve retributive goals, as it provides an outlet for the expression of
the community’s disapproval at the offender’s act and allows
disparate actors to punish the offender by attacking his
reputation.151 This can have significant negative effects for the
offender even when he is able to counteract institutional forms of
punishment.

Letterlough, 205 A.D.2d 803, 804, 613 N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (requiring
the defendant to place a “CONVICTED DWI” sign on his license plate); People v.
McDowell, 59 Cal. App. 3d 807, 812–13, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Cal. App. 1976) (requiring
the defendant who was a purse thief who used tennis shoes to approach his victims
quietly and flee swiftly to wear tap shoes); Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So.2d 123, 124
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (requiring a defendant to place a sticker: “CONVICTED
D.U.I.—RESTRICTED LICENSE” on their car); Ballenger v. Georgia, 436 S.E.2d 793,
794 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (imposing a condition requiring the offender to wear a
fluorescent pink plastic bracelet imprinted with the words “D.U.I. CONVICT”). See
contra People v. Hackler, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 686 –87 (1993), (requiring a shoplifting
offender to wear a t-shirt whenever he left the house reading, “My record plus two
six-packs equals four years” on the front and “I am on felony probation for theft”
on the back. This was struck down in appeal on the ground that the objective was
to “public[ly] ridicule and humiliate[e]” and not “to foster rehabilitation.” Id. at 686
–87); People v. Johnson, 174 Ill. App.3d 812, 124 Ill. Dec. 252, 528 N.E.2d 1360 (1988),
(requiring a DWI offender to publish a newspaper advertisement with apology and
mug shot. This was struck down because it “possibly, add[ed] public ridicule as a
condition” and was contrary to the goal of rehabilitation. Id. at 1362).
150 See U.S. v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (2004), supra note 131, at 599 (imposing a
sentence that included performing community service while wearing a signboard
stating that he stole mail on a defendant convicted of mail theft in order to better
comport with the court’s aim of deterrence); see also E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077,
1120–21 (1997)
. . . notification results in shaming the offender, thereby effecting some
amount of retribution. This suffering ‘serves as a threat of negative
repercussions [thereby] discourag[ing] people from engaging in certain
behavior.’ It is, therefore, also a deterrent. There is no disputing this
deterrent signal; the notification provisions are triggered by behavior that
is already a crime, suggesting that those who consider engaging in such
behavior should beware.
151 See Chad Flanders, Shame and the Meanings of Punishment, 54 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 609, 612 (2006) (noting that “shaming punishments replace a concrete physical
harm with a largely symbolic or expressive one . . . ”); see also Dan Kahan, What’s
Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 2075, 2087 (2006) (suggesting
that shaming will not be effective because egalitarian citizens will not embrace it as
an alternative means of punishment).
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3.3. Objections to Shaming
To be sure, shaming might have negative consequences.152 As in
the case of traditional punishments, offenders might form subgroups where norm-breaking is tolerated (or even celebrated).153
The goal of these sub-groups might be to offer support—such as
financial or legal support—for the offender and provide protection
from negative consequences.154 Gangs and terrorist organizations
are examples of such sub-communities.155 Aside from these issues,
shaming risks idiosyncratic enforcement depending upon factors
unrelated to the quality of the offence. For instance, India and
Pakistan were treated more charitably than North Korea after
testing nuclear weapons, although all three states acted in
The strategic
contravention of international law norms.156
importance of these states to the United States might have
influenced its support for minimal punishment for possessing
nuclear weapons, in contrast to states such as North Korea and Iran,
which have been dealt with more harshly.157 However, it must be
acknowledged that inequality and disproportionality are problems
152 Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
733, 748 (1998) (stating that “shame punishments may be disproportionately too
weak or . . . too strong”); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST,
SHAME, AND THE LAW 15 (2004) (arguing that a type of shame called “primitive
shame” is “a way of hiding from our humanity that is irrational . . . bound up with
narcissism”); Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 645, 648 (1997) (explaining that shaming can create a desire for retaliation); Toni
M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1884
(1991) (stating that “the limiting concerns of proportionality, equality, and cruelty .
. . point against use of [shaming] penalties.”).
153 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989) (stating that
“[offenders] associate with others who are perceived in some limited or total way
as also at odds with mainstream standards.”).
154 See Kahan, supra note 133, at 2095 (concluding that shame creates an
“inescapable expressive partisanship.”).
155 David A. Skeel, Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1817-18
(2001); BRAITHWAITE, supra note 135.
156 See Uttara Choudhury, Seven years after going nuclear, India and Pakistan
thriving, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (June 2, 2005), http://www.spacewar.com/
2005/050602015347.lmtxze92.html. (“Based on the experiences of India and
Pakistan since they tested nuclear weapons in 1998, North Korea could be forgiven
for thinking the price of carrying out an atomic test is worth paying.”).
157 Bill Nicholas, Condemnation Swift, but Options are Limited, USA TODAY (Oct.
9 2006), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/educate/college/polisci/articles/
20061015.htm (citing Ted Galen Carpenter’s explanation that North Korea’s
rationale for testing nuclear weapons is to gain bargaining power like Pakistan).
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that bedevil even traditional sanctions and therefore are not fatal
objections to shaming.
Another objection to shaming is that the tactic entails costs just
like other types of punishments.158 It is costly for an individual to
build and maintain a reputation, and the wasting of these
expenditures may not always outweigh benefits obtained by
adversely impacting that reputation.159 Further, imposing the
shaming punishment also entails a cost—the community has to
undertake activities that go beyond mere cheap talk in order to
effectively shame the offender.160 For example, a state that wishes
to subject another state to shaming might have to end commercial
relationships between its business entities and those in the shamed
state with the result that its citizens experience an increase in prices
for commodities and consumer goods. It would also have to expend
resources on policing rogue companies that choose to defy its
instructions, etc.161
Critics also argue that modern society does not offer conducive
conditions for shaming because of the lack of social
interdependence;162 social heterogeneity creates problems of
definition pertaining to the kinds of offences that might engender a
feeling of shame.163 However, this objection has little salience
because nation states are extremely interdependent. These
relationships of interdependence mean that shaming can result in
lost developmental aid and grants,164 termination of foreign direct
investment,165 the efflux of foreign institutional investors from stock
markets inflicting losses on investors,166 the collapse of a state’s
Kahan & Posner, supra note 140, at 372.
Skeel, supra note 137, at 1818–19.
160 Id. at 1819.
161 Id.
162 Massaro, supra note 141, at 1917 (noting that shaming is ineffective in part
due to cities’ in the United States lack of interdependence and cohesiveness).
163 Id. at 1923. (“Thus, even if a particular community could theoretically
impose shame on an offender, a given judge’s particular method of accomplishing
that goal may still be off the mark.”).
164 Rich Nielsen, Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions against
Repressive States, 57 INT’L STUD. Q. 791, 791 (2012) (finding that aid donors withdraw
aid when repressive acts are publicized in the media).
165 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade
Agreements Influence Government Repression, 59 INT’L ORG. 593, 595 (2005).
166 Not Open for Business: Despite Elections, Investor Risk Remains High in Burma,
CONFLICT RISK NETWORK, (Apr. 2012), http://endgenocide.org/images/uploads/
downloads/burma-not-open-for-business.pdf.
158
159
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currency,167 the embargoing of contracts with companies based in
the offending state,168 restrictions on the repatriation of capital to
that state,169 restrictions on travel to and from that state,170 and the
suspension and expulsion of that state from multilateral
organizations.171
A powerful critique of shaming is about the lack of authority and
legitimacy. Shaming punishments are typically imposed by a variety
of actors which might include NGOs, international organiazations,
media agencies, and private actors. As is apparent, NGOs, media
agencies, and private actors do not possess authority in any formal
legal sense. In other words, the offending state is not subject to these
organizations under any legal instrument. Moreover, the primary
addressees of international law are sovereign states which are only
bound by consent. Therefore, the argument is that these NGOs and
private actors do not possess any authority to impose punishment
on sovereign states. The second criticism pertains to the lack of
legitimacy. This is related to the idea that shaming is imposed
without the preconditions of legitimacy antecedent to the
imposition of traditional punishments in domestic law. These
pertain to the existence of legal rules that result from democratic
participation in law-making, identified institutions charged with
formal legal authority for enforcement, formal processes for
establishment of rule violations and procedural safeguards to

167 Iran Arrests 50 Over Currency Decline, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 24, 2012),
http://news.yahoo.com/iran-arrests-50-over-currency-decline-122538312-finance.html.
168 Judge Blocks Fla. Cuba, Syria Business Ties Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 26,
2012),
http://cnsnews.com/print/news/article/judge-blocks-fla-cuba-syriabusiness-ties-law.
169 U.S. Government Eases Sanctions Against Burma, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (July 12,
2012),
http://www.sidley.com/en/news/us-government-eases-sanctionsagainst-burma-07-12-2012; Council Decision 2012/365/CFSP, amending Decision
2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran, 2012 O.J. (L 282) 58–
69.
170 Press Release, Council of the European Union, Human rights violations:
Council tightens sanctions against Iran (Mar. 23, 2012), available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/
foraff/129215.pdf.
171 The Positive and Punitive Power of CMAG, COMMONWEALTH QUARTERLY,
(2008), available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/EZInformation/176155/
060308cmag/. Organization of Islamic Cooperation Suspends Syria’s Membership, AL
ARABIYA NEWS (Aug. 13, 2012), http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/08/
13/232088.html.
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protect the rights of offenders, and certain fundamental rights that
constrain both the power to make rules and enforce them.
The first element of legitimacy—legal rules enacted pursuant to
a formal institutional process typically subject to democratic
participation—is somewhat easy to overcome in situations
involving codified legal rules where a state has ratified a treaty or
convention embodying those rules. The assumption is that
legitimacy is conferred by the state’s participation in lawmaking,
secondary participation by its domestic institutional actors, and
tertiary involvement by lay citizens. Such legitimacy is presumed
even if a particular state does not possess mandatory constitutional
requirements for the international rules to be debated in domestic
parliaments or for its citizens to participate in any meaningful sense.
The very fact of the ratification of the international law instrument
adopted pursuant to a formal legal process by an organization with
subject-matter authority confers the rule with legitimacy, at least in
the formal legal sense. This is analogous to the making of domestic
legal rules. However, there are several complications. First,
customary international law rules, particularly those derived from
colonial times, raise questions about legitimacy because of the
absence of participation from erstwhile colonies. Second, modern
codified rules are created by institutions with the active
participation of states with gross actual violations of the rules being
proposed, raising questions about whether the rules are really
meant to be binding in any meaningful sense.172 Third, although
most states participate in the drafting and adopting process, the
reality is that the rules are a reflection of the interests of dominant
powers. Weaker states are often mute spectators in the lawmaking
process because their representatives are at a disadvantage due to of
deficits in technical capacity, resources, and lobbying capabilities.
The second element—institutions for enforcement—is again
satisfied where a treaty regime creates a machinery for monitoring
and policing state commitments. It is of course possible that many
treaty regimes do not create institutional mechanisms and merely
embody obligations.
The reasons are obvious—monitoring
institutions are costly and many states are unwilling to contribute to
mechanisms for policing breaches due to self-interested reasons. In
such circumstances, there is an enforcement gap, and NGOs,
individual states, and private actors seek to fill the void. States
172 E.g., consider the legitimacy of laws criminalizing domestic violence
created by a parliament comprised largely of domestic abusers.
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might seek to enforce either because they were active in the adoption
of the treaty or because of a deep commitment to the underlying
principles behind the rules, or because enforcement coincides with
their strategic interests in relation to the offender state. NGOs might
seek to fill the gap because enforcement coincides with their raison
d’être, generates support from members or funders, or for other
reasons. All these instances of shaming raise legitimacy concerns.
The third element—processes for establishing breaches of the
rules and imposing procedural fairness requirements—generates
significant problems in the shaming context because many of the
instances of state shaming are bereft of such protections.173
Considering the empirical evidence of partisanship and
politicization in the deployment of shaming, critics claim that
shaming fails the test of fairness. In situations where NGOs or
media outlets engage in shaming campaigns, these agencies are not
bound by legal obligations to ensure that the offender is innocent
unless proven guilty. Nor do they have legal obligations to afford
the offender an opportunity to defend itself adequately, to protect
against coercion, to take account of precedent or to ensure that
punishment is proportionate to the wrong committed. In such
circumstances, shaming fails the test of legitimacy because the fact
finding and blame imposing processes are not subject to adequate
legal safeguards. The objection is not without merit in relation to
private actors. Crucially, these objections about procedural fairness
do not survive in relation to institutions such as the instant COI The
COI under the aegis of the international legal system is capable of
achieving acceptable levels of adjudicative neutrality, giving an
opportunity for the accused state to defend itself, protecting against
illegal coercion, and taking account of precedent.
The final element of the legitimacy claim—lack of fundamental
rights to limit the power of rulers to make law and enforce them—
manifested typically in domestic constitutions and bolstered by
judicial review is presented in the shaming context, for example,
when there is disproportionality in punishment. In the domestic
context, one of the limits on the design of punishment is
proportionality—that punishment fits the crime. Under this head,
173 See Seth Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) (“The power
of public opprobrium, once evoked, is often more pervasive and more penetrating
than criminal punishment. As the volume of information controlled by the state
increases, so too does the government's ability to sanction dis-favored activities by
the simple act of public disclosure.”).
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punishment is carefully calibrated both in degree and
administration with designated officials and institutions charged
with both aspects. In contrast, shaming operates without any
control over the degree of punishment or how—and by whom—it is
to be administered. Therefore, some offenders are over-punished
and others are under-punished.174 This is exacerbated by the high
degrees of uncertainty and unpredictability of both the finding of
guilt and the administration of punishment.175
3.4. Shaming the State
From the above, it is clear that labels such as “rogue” and
“pariah” attach at the level of the state. The idea is based on
traditional notions of enterprise liability.176 As is the case with
collectively organised forms of business, such as corporations,
liability is imposed on the collective body which bears responsibility
for the actions of its agents. Enterprise liability externalizes the cost
of monitoring when the conduct is at micro-level with attendant
asymmetries of knowledge, resources, and information between
enforcers and offenders. The prospect of liability creates incentives
for the entity to invest in monitoring the conduct of its agents.177
When agents engage in bad conduct, they are disciplined by their
superiors and the chain of responsibility for monitoring stops with
the board in the case of large modern companies.
It is necessary to shame states because they are the primary
actors in international law and they have to be held to account for
commitments they enter into with each other. Enforcement is
necessary if these commitments are to be regarded as legally
binding. Therefore, a key test of these commitments is whether there
is enforcement in practice. Lebovic and Voeten conducted a study
examining the consequences for states that ratified the ICCPR,
174 James Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1088 (1988).
175 See Tim Eaton, Prosecutor Kills Himself in Texas Raid Over Child Sex, N.Y.
TIMES, (Nov. 6, 2006) http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/07/us/07pedophile.
html (noting that the suicide of a prosecutor who allegedly solicited a person he
believed to be thirteen years of age following a Dateline NBC sting is a sobering
reminder of the dangerous consequences of shaming punishments).
176 David Skeel, supra note 142, at 1829 (examining the effects of shaming a
corporation).
177 Id.
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noting, “[d]uring the Cold War, states that signed and ratified the
ICCPR treaty were about twice as likely to be shamed by public
resolution than were states that failed to do so.” Clearly, rather than
pure partisanship and ad hoc imposition, the treaty system seems to
be creating a set of contract-type expectations which are then
enforceable by the imposition of a shame sanction.178 The
architecture of the treaty defines the legal obligations assumed by
the ratifying state and provides criteria for other states to make
evaluative judgements about whether subsequent behavior
conforms to performance expectations.179
Shaming is aimed at targeting a state’s self-image because there
is ample evidence that states deeply care about their self-image and
invest considerable resources in building and projecting it. In many
contexts, this self-image and its external manifestations are in the
form of a brand and exhibit property-type characteristics.
Therefore, shaming a state to negatively affect its self-image and
brand for the international law norm violations committed by its
officers is akin to imposing a punishment that reduces one’s
property interests.180 There might be internal and external aspects
to this shame depending upon the depth of a state’s sense of
identity. Under ideal conditions, for a state with a strong sense of
identity and attendant conceptions of national pride, the imposition
of a shame sanction triggers internal consequences.181 These might
178 The study by Lebovic and Voeten revealed that members that signed and
ratified the ICCPR treaty judge target states that also committed to the treaty more
harshly than states that did not and conclude that shaming practices in the UNHRC
are based, in part, on a desire to hold states accountable for their commitments . . .
countries that have signed and ratified the ICCPR treaty do not appear to share
characteristics (e.g., human rights records) that could explain why the probability
of a vote to punish a target rises precipitously when both the target and voter are
parties to the ICCPR treaty. See generally James Lebovic and Erik Voeten, The Politics
of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR, 50 INT’L
STUD. Q. 861 (2006).
179 Id. at 885

States do not appear to get favorable treatment from the commission
merely by paying lip service to important principles. To the contrary, the
acts of signing and ratifying treaties or achieving formal membership
within IOs seem not to contribute directly toward reputation-building in
the international community. If these agreements and memberships
matter, it is in raising expectations when members of the community
evaluate the conduct of other states. Simply put, states expect others to
deliver on their promises.
E.g., a fine.
Thomas Risse & Stephen Ropp, International Human Rights Norms and
Domestic Change: Conclusions, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 234, 254 (1999).
180
181
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be manifested by exercises in self-reflection,182 formalized
institutional processes aimed at establishing the truth and
identifying offenders,183 structural reforms,184 corrective legislation,
punishment for offenders,185 reparations for victims,186 and
apologies.187 In contrast to these situations, states might engage in a
refutation of shaming campaigns, and the shaming is therefore
confined to extracting external consequences.188 Under either
scenario, shaming the state creates incentives for better monitoring
and law abidance. In some cases, such incentives might result in
greater investment in promoting better conduct, e.g., by ratifying
182 E. Dresler-Hawke & J. H.Liu, Collective Shame and the Positioning of German
National Identity, 32 PSICOLOGÍA POLÍTICA 131–53 (2006); Michael Johns et al.,
Ashamed to Be an American? The Role of Identification in Predicting Vicarious Shame for
Anti-Arab Prejudice After 9-11, (2005) 4 SELF AND IDENTITY, 331–348.
183 Day of Shame for British Army: Shocking Brutality Uncovered by Inquiry,
LONDON EVENING STANDARD (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.standard.co.uk/news/
day-of-shame-for-british-army-shocking-brutality-uncovered-by-inquiry6441146.html.
184 Ryan Goodman, International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual,
Empirical, and Normative Challenges, 54 DUKE LJ 983, 995 (2004).
185 Following an abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, several U.S.
military personnel serving at the prison were convicted on multiple charges by
court martial and incarcerated, Graner Gets 10 years for Abu Ghraib Abuse, NBC NEWS
(Jan. 16, 2005),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6795956/ns/world_newsmideast_n_africa/t/graner-gets-years-abu-ghraib-abuse/; Liz Beavers, England
Back in Mineral County, CUMBERLAND TIMES (Mar. 25, 2007), http://www.timesnews.com/england-back-in-mineral-county/article_5919dee3-e19a-50c4-8ac8f9c7b408c07d.html .
186 For example, Maher Arar, a Syrian-Canadian who was deported from the
United States to Syria after Canadian officials falsely suspected him of terrorist
activities, was awarded $10.5 million in damages from the Canadian government
following a public inquiry. Josh Tapper, Barack Obama Should Apologize to Maher
Arar, Rights Groups Say, TORONTO STAR (May 22, 2012), http://www.thestar.com/
news/canada/2012/05/22/barack_obama_should_apologize_to_maher_arar_rig
hts_groups_say.html.
187 Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia, Apology to the Stolen
Generations
(Feb.
13,
2008),
available
athttp://www.dfat.gov.au/indigenous/apology-to-stolengenerations/national_apology.html.
188 Libya’s oil industry, for example, was hit hard by UN sanctions imposed
after the bombing of two commercial airplanes in the late 1980s. By 2001, the total
cost of these sanctions to the Libyan economy was estimated to be $18 billion by the
World Bank and $33 billion by Libyan government. See Ray Takeyh, The Rogue Who
Came in from the Cold, FOREIGN AFF.62, 64 (2001). However, sanctions against the Ian
Smith regime in Rhodesia succeeded in making the country wholly dependent on
trade with apartheid-era South Africa. Once Western countries managed to disrupt
that trading relationship, the Rhodesian economy was brought to its knees. Robert
O. Matthews, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Prerequisites of a Settlement(1989-1990), 45
INT’L J. 292, 302, 327 et seq. (1990).
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international law instruments; bonding or improving the training of
police or military personnel; employing more lawyers in the defence
hierarchy; preventing or employing anti-corruption staff and
human rights commissions; and monitoring, while in other cases it
translates into greater resources for punitive enforcement, e.g., more
police, courts, and prisons. The net result from the operation of
these incentives is that a state acts rationally to minimize the
probability of being punished because it cares about the negative
consequences of shaming.
The empirical evidence is less clear. Other things being equal,
shaming sanctions appear to be imposed less frequently upon richer
states than on poorer states.189 Authors who have studied shaming
by the United Nations Human Rights Commission (“UNHCR”)
write that despite there being eleven attempts at censuring China
between 1991 and 2001, none proved to be successful.190 The study
examined other variables that predicted when a state would become
a target for shaming at UNHRC. States seen to be more cooperative
than others or those that made a greater contribution to common
objectives were, unsurprisingly, less likely to be targeted by other
states.191 For example, the authors found that “regardless of their
rights records, states that failed to participate in peacekeeping
missions in the prior year ran about twice the risk of being targeted
by the commission as did participating states. [Similarly,] states that
vote in the UN [General Assembly] only half the time are about
twice as likely to be targeted than are states that vote all the time.”192
The difficulty of disparities in punishment actions relative to power
189 During the Cold War, a state with average capabilities was able to escape
sanctions or to keep the charges against it confidential 44% of the time; a state with
capabilities one standard deviation above the mean (e.g., Austria or Morocco)
avoided more than confidential treatment 66% of the time. The effect is only slightly
less pronounced in the post-Cold War period; the values are 25% and 42%,
respectively. See James H. Lebovic & Erik Voeten, The Politics of Shame: The
Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR, 50 INTL’ STUD. Q. 861,
878 (2006).
190 As the ability of Saudi Arabia and China to escape condemnation indicates,
there is still good reason to be suspicious of the impartiality of the UNHCR’s public
shaming process. Id. at 884.
191 In the Cold War period, a state with a perfect attendance record in the UNGA
is less than half as likely to have a public resolution adopted against it as is a country
that participates only 50%of the time . . . targeted states that faithfully vote in the
UNGA escape without punishment or with confidential consideration an estimated
54% of the time, whereas a state that participates only half the time that it is eligible
can make the same claim only 13% of the time. Id. at 877–78.
192 Id.
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and influence is not necessarily a problem as long as punishment is
attempted—our claim is that shaming has the potential to affect state
behavior in ways that matter for law, not that all states are punished
equally all of the time. The ultimate success of prosecution and
degree of punishment imposed is a function of a number of factors,
not least of which is relative power and resources—no different
from traditional law enforcement.
A complicating factor for shaming at the state level is its
politicization.193 This is particularly problematic at the multilateral
organization level when there is capture by partisan interests. One
study of practice at UNHRC found that during the Cold War,
“political alignment with the [U.S.] greatly increased the prospect
that countries were subject to severe sanctions. Targeted states that
consistently voted with the [U.S.] were virtually assured (a
probability of .93) of being sanctioned by a public resolution.”194
This declined following the end of the Cold War, but “states were
more likely to favour countries with similar alliances and to oppose
countries with dissimilar alliances. This conclusion is further
reinforced by the impact of a convergence in domestic ideology.”195
3.5. Shaming the Regime
Shaming the regime is preferable to shaming the state when the
latter is either not congruent with blame for the wrong or when
shaming the state is not effective. Several reasons exist for this: first,
as illustrated by the North Korean example, the relationship
between the offending public officials and the citizens of the state is
likely to be quite attenuated. To be sure, shaming the entire North
Korean state in such circumstances is both unfair and ineffective. It
is unfair because shaming punishes innocent people who are victims
of the actions of the regime and ineffective because the citizens are
unlikely to experience shame for illegal actions that they did not
commit. In other words, the citizen is likely to behave more as a
victim than as an offender and shaming is wasted.
193 Id. (“foreign policy positions, as measured by votes in the UNGA, has a
significant and substantial effect on the decision by a state to withhold punishment
of another (hence, the negative coefficients) in both the Cold War and post-Cold
War periods.”).
194 Lebovic and Voeten, supra note 18, at 876.
195 Id.
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Some of these difficulties in shaming the state as an entity can be
resolved by shaming the regime instead. Even so, fairness requires
that shame should be restricted to the individual offenders rather
than the entire government.
One response might be to limit shaming to the ruler when the
decision is made by him or at his behest. This has the virtue of
protecting innocent actors from undeserved punishment. States that
are ruled by ideational figures, personality cults, and dynastic
families are prime targets. A totalitarian regime such as North
Korea, where executive power vests in one individual or a
dictatorial regime, provides a good example. The work of the COI is
an illustration of shaming the regime because of specific findings
made against the Supreme Leader.
In an ideal scenario, shaming triggers both an internal and
external response in the ruler; internal in the sense that the ruler
experiences moral shame and undertakes corrective action to punish
wrongdoers, compensate victims and prevent future occurrences
because he genuinely believes that the conduct is wrongful.196 In
less ideal conditions, the response might be purely external: faced
with the shame sanction, the ruler takes some action to assuage
external actors while continuing to covertly condone or ignore the
wrong.197 These externally directed actions might be accompanied
by denials of any wrongdoing.198 North Korea has exhibited these
reactions at several points in its history including after the
publication of the COI Report.
Notably, shaming the ruler comes with its own set of unintended
consequences. A rational ruler might be assumed to weigh the cost
from being shamed when acting on the international plane. The
ruler must ask if the cost he is likely to incur from successful
shaming activity by third parties outweighs the benefits conferred
from the act. If the cost exceeds the benefits, a rational ruler will
forego the action. Logically, the shaming activity depends on the
wrong act being detected. Therefore, rulers might attempt to hide
information about wrongs committed by themselves or their lower
level functionaries, calculating that if the acts do not attract public
196 See Sandeep Gopalan, Alternative Sanctions and Social Norms in International
Law: The Case of Abu Ghraib, MICH. ST. L. REV.,785, 793-94 (2007).
197 Bahrain’s Human-Rights Report: the King’s Risky Move, THE ECONOMIST (Nov.
26, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21540304.
198 Sri Lanka’s Empty Promises and Denial of Rights Crisis Exposed at UN, AMNESTY
INT’L., (Nov. 1, 2012), available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/
news/2012/11/sri-lanka-s-empty-promises-and-denial-rights-crisis-exposed-un/.
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scrutiny there is less likelihood of shaming.199 Thus, one of the
unintended consequences of shaming the ruler might be to create
incentives for suppressing information about wrongs committed by
lower level officials.
It is not clear that all rulers are equally responsive to shaming;
and some rulers are more responsive than others. For example,
rulers with strong claims to moral or ethical leadership,200 rulers
whose grip on power is infirm,201 those who need good reputations
to join regional associations or trade groups,202 those who need to
attract international investment,203 those who need loans from
199 Access to Information in Mexico: Migration and National Security,
FREEDOMINFO.ORG (June 28 2012), http://www.freedominfo.org/2012/06/accessto-information-in-mexico-migration-and-national-security/.
200 Religious leaders, in particular, such as the Pope, might be susceptible to
shaming. See Cathy L. Grossman, Sex Abuse Scandal Drives Down Pope Benedict's U.S.
Approval Ratings, USA TODAY (Mar. 29, 2010), http://content.usatoday.com/
communities/Religion/post/2010/03/pope-benedict-sex-abuse-survey-ratingsfall/1 (noting that opinions of religious leaders are documented and published); See
also Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Opening Statement to
the 29th Session of the Human Rights Council by the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (June 15, 2015), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16074&LangID=E. , (naming
states involved in possible human rights violations).
201 See FRANK SCHIMMELFENNIG, NATO'S ENLARGEMENT TO THE EAST: AN
ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING, EAPC-NATO INDIVIDUAL FELLOWSHIP
REPORT 1998-2000 64, available at http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/
schimmelfennig.pdf

. . . the opponents and skeptics of enlargement within the alliance could
not openly oppose and block enlargement either without experiencing
genuine cognitive dissonance and shame or without risking to reveal a
hypocritical, self-serving attitude toward the alliance's norms and mission
and to lose their credibility and reputation as members of the community
in good standing.
202 See György Szondi, The Role and Challenges of Country Branding in Transition
Countries: The Central and Eastern European Experience, 3 PLACE BRANDING AND PUB.
DIPL. 8, 10 (2007)

Central European countries' most important foreign policy goals were to
join NATO and the European Union, two 'superbrands'. Countries in
transition rely on the moral, financial and political support of more
developed regions or nations, called 'centre nations', such as the Western
European countries. The less developed or transitional countries are often
situated on the 'periphery'. In their orientation the transitional countries
are moving from the periphery towards the centre position and the
function of branding is to support and justify this 'move' and demonstrate
that these countries are worthy of the centre nations' support. Branding
can also be interpreted as the periphery's call for legitimisation.
203 Libya,
for example, following a decades-long shame campaign
spearheaded by the United States and United Kingdom, eventually agreed to
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multilateral lending agencies,204 and those who need support from
allies205 are probably most responsive to shame sanctions. In
contrast, rulers who resist external norms,206 have established
reputations for denouncing the dominant international actors,207 or
extradite two suspects in the PanAm bombing and to pay compensation to the
victim’s families. This action permitted Libya to normalize its aviation industry and
to attract much needed foreign investment to fully exploit its oilfields. John H.
Donboli & Farnaz Kashefi, Doing Business in the Middle East: A Primer for U.S.
Companies, 38(2) CORNELL INT’L. L. J. 413, 451 (2005); Jad Mouawad, Libya Tempts
Executives
With
Big
Oil
Reserves,
N.Y. TIMES
(Jan.
2,
2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/02/ business/libya-tempts-executiveswithbig-oil-reserves.html?_r=0.
204 In 1994, the World Bank obligated Burkina Faso to “[i]ncorporate a pledge
in its policy framework paper to curb female genital mutilation.” Canan Gunduz,
Human Rights and Development: The World Bank’s Need for a Consistent Approach 18
DESTIN STUD. INST., WORKING PAPER SERIES 3) (2004), available at
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP/WP49.pdf.
Two
years later, Burkina Faso criminalized female genital mutilation and formed a
national committee charged with combatting the practice. Heidi Jones, Nafissatou
Diop, Ian Askew, & Inoussa Kaboré, Female Genital Cutting Practices in Burkina Faso
and Mali and Their Negative Health Outcomes, 30 STUD. FAMILY PLAN. 219, 220 (1999),
available
at
http://www.popcouncil.org/uploads/pdfs/councilarticles/
sfp/SFP303Jones.pdf.
205 Ulrike Demmer & Christoph Schult, Unreliable Partners? Germany’s
Reputation in NATO Has Hit Rock Bottom, SPIEGEL, (May 17, 2012)
http://www.spiegel. de/international/world/criticism-of-germany-s-militaryrole-in-the-nato-alliance-a-833503.html.
206 In 2008, Robert Mugabe was stripped of an honorary British knighthood
that had been bestowed in 1994, as a mark of revulsion at the abuse of human rights
and abject disregard for the democratic process in Zimbabwe over which President
Mugabe has presided. Mugabe is Stripped of Knighthood as Mark of Revulsion, THE
SCOTSMAN (Jun. 25, 2008), http://www.scotsman.com/news/uk/
mugabe-isstripped-of-knighthood-as-a-mark-of-revulsion-1-1077561# axzz3o471H8rT. In
close temporal proximity, Mugabe was stripped of several honorary degrees he had
been awarded by Western universities in the 1980s. Paul Kelbie, Edinburgh
University Revokes Mugabe Degree, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 15, 2007),
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/jul/15/highereducation.internationaled
ucationnews; Michigan State Revokes Mugabe’s Honorary Degree, ASSOC. PRESS (Sept.
16, 2008), available at http://diverseeducation.com/article/11685/.
207 Hugo Chavez is a good example of such a figure. At a press conference on
August 2, 2012, Chavez denounced European nations for funding Syrian rebels and
terrorists in the ongoing conflict in that country. Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez
Criticizes West Over Syria, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/video/2012/aug/02/venezuela-hugo-chavez-syria-video;
Chavez, Ahmadinejad Denounce West's Imperialist Aggression in Libya, Syria, JAGRAN
POST (Aug. 17, 2011), http://post.jagran.com/chavez-ahmadinejad-denouncewests-imperialist-aggression-in-libya-syria-1313592746. In 2006, Chavez famously
referred to then-US-President George Bush as “the devil” during a speech to the
UN General Assembly, taking the opportunity in follow-up interviews to criticize
the Second Iraq War and Washington-back capitalist reforms in Latin America. Tim
Padgett, Chavez: Bush Has Called Me Worse Things, TIME MAGAZINE (Sept. 22, 2006),
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are pursuing a different ideology, which provides internal
justifications for their actions, are unlikely to be responsive to
shaming.208 Regimes and rulers with economic or political
importance generate their own difficulties.209
Under such
circumstances, a ruler is likely to be less responsive to shame
sanctions because of the strategic or economic importance of his
country.210 Even so, unless the ruler has egregiously criminal
tendencies,211 he will be responsive to shaming on a scale that varies
from weakly responsive to strongly responsive. If the ruler enjoys
widespread domestic support and has a weak opposition,212 or is a
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1538296,00.html#
ixzz2G6BzUvhc.
208 For example, the Taliban destroyed the irreplaceable Bamiyan Buddhas in
2001, despite an international outcry in which several countries, including Iran,
offered to purchase the historical statues, due to a “religious obligation to destroy
idols.” Alex Spillius, Taliban Ignore All Appeals to Save Buddhas, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar.
5,
2001),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
afghanistan/1325119/Taliban-ignore-all-appeals-to-save-Buddhas.html.
209 China and Russia have both been able to use their permanent seats on the
Security Council to avoid action on Tibet and Chechnya, respectively. Despite the
personal popularity for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan cause in many Western
States, China’s rising importance has ensured that the issue has slipped off the
international agenda. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2000: CHINA
AND TIBET – THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (2000), available at
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k1/asia/china3.html
(describing
China’s
persistence in curbing basic freedoms despite domestic and foreign pressure).
210 See, e.g., David Eimer, China Dismisses US Criticism of its Human Rights
Record, THE TELEGRAPH (Apr. 10, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/asia/china/8441374/China-Dismisses-US-Criticism-of-its-humanrights-record.html (noting how China fired back at the United States for criticizing
its human rights record); World Report 2015: China, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2015),
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/china-and-tibet.
211 Examples of this type of ruler include Idi Amin of Uganda and Pol Pot of
Cambodia. Idi Amin’s rule has been described as “a synonym for barbarity” and
the man himself as “possessed of an animal magnetism” which he wielded with
“sadistic skill”. Amin attributed God-like powers to himself, and exhibited such
irrational behavior that most foreign leaders who had contact with him came to the
concluded that he was, in fact, clinically insane. Amin was ruthless in dealing with
real and imagined political opponents and his reign caused the deaths of an
estimated 300,000 people. Patrick Keatley, Obituary: Idi Amin, THE GUARDIAN(Aug.
18,
2003),
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2003/aug/18/
guardianobituaries. Amin often acted based on erratic reasons, and via sadistic
methods, e.g., beating to death with sledge hammers. Death of a Buffoon and Killer,
NEW SCOTSMAN, (Aug. 17, 2003), http://www.scotsman.com/news/
international/death-of-a-despot-buffoon-and-killer-1-1292740.
212 For example, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Support for Mugabe’s chief
opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change, fell from 38% in 2010 to only
20% in mid-2012. Lydia Polgreen, Less Support for Opposition in Zimbabwe, Study
Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/23/
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dictator without any resistance, he will be weakly responsive at best.
Similarly, if the ruler thrives on challenging the dominant
international structure or is leading a revolutionary government
fighting against claimed injustices perpetrated by foreign actors,
shame has little chance of succeeding.213 To the contrary, in such
cases, shaming by international actors serves to establish that ruler’s
reputation for fearlessness and in some cases can be effectively
utilized to buttress his or her position among his domestic
constituency.214
3.6. Shaming North Korea
International human rights groups have engaged in shaming
campaigns against North Korea for a long time. This is despite the
realization that the nature of the regime makes any prospect of
engaging with it in order to achieve change rather remote.215 When
world/africa/support-for-opposition-in-zimbabwe-declines-study-shows.html?_
r=0. The MDC has faced many challenges, including attempting to pacify a diverse
supporting base of its own and a leadership weakened by accusations of treason
and Mugabe’s populist policies, such as accelerated land redistribution. Chris
Maroleng, Situation Report: Zimbabwe Movement for Democratic Change, INST. FOR
SECURITY STUD. (May 3, 2004), available at http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/
jspui/bitstream/123456789/31353/1/ZIMMAY04.pdf?1.
213 Slobodan Milosevic, for example, always positioned himself as the
defender of the Serbian people against foreign aggression. In a 2001 BBC interview,
following his extradition to face war crimes charges at The Hague, Milosevic’s wife
Mira Markovic stated, “I don't feel any shame. On the contrary, I'm proud of my
people and I am sure that throughout its history it pursued—as far as wars are
concerned—a defence policy.” Mrs. Markovic blamed Western powers for the
bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia and claimed that Mr. Milosevic was an
inspiration to “many poor, small and humiliated nations throughout the world.”
Wife Hails Milosevic the 'Freedom Fighter', BBC NEWS (Sept. 7, 2001),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1529200.stm. Milosevic himself phoned Fox
News from his cell phone to give a live interview stating, “I’m proud of everything
I did in defending my country and my people.” MilosevicGives TV Interview from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
Cell,
BBC
NEWS(Aug.
24,
2001),
europe/1507660.stm.
214 John F Dickerson, Why Bush Is Giving Schroeder the Cold Shoulder, TIME
MAGAZINE(Sept. 30, 2002),
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/
0,8599,356168,00.html; Dan Collins, Schroeder Claims Narrow Victory, CBS NEWS
(Sept. 20, 2002), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/schroeder-claims-narrowvictory/; Steven Komarow, Schroeder Sticks to Opposing War with Iraq, USA TODAY
(Sept. 23, 2002), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-09-23germany_x.htm.
215 As a Human Rights Watch official noted in 2011, in reference to Kim JongIl
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the current Supreme Leader assumed power following the death of
his father, the International Coalition to Stop Crime against
Humanity in North Korea addressed a letter to him utilizing
language geared at triggering self-reflection: “we believe [you
could] enhance your leadership, improve the standing of your
country and benefit your people.”216 The Coalition pointed out that
over 200,000 people were being detained in prison or labor camps
and that “human rights of the vast majority of the 24.5 million North
Korean people are routinely violated, despite the fact that the DPRK
government has ratified and is therefore bound to respect the rights
contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.”217 It “appeal[ed to him] to change course at this critical
juncture of North Korean history, just a few months before the April
15, 2012, celebration of the 100th year of the birth of . . . Kim IlSung.”218
Human Rights Watch repeatedly called for the
establishment of a UN commission of inquiry: “North Korea’s
defiance of the UN Human Rights Council’s mandates and
mechanisms should not be allowed to stand. It’s time for the UN to
take the next step, and ratchet up the pressure by [setting up a
COI].”219

The conventional wisdom is that he would not have cared, that talking
more in public about human rights, or pressing North Korean leaders
directly on issues like labor camps, would have done nothing for the
country’s people, while making diplomacy even more difficult. This sense
of futility became another reason to push North Korea’s horrors from the
forefront of our minds. Kim Jong Il became more often a subject of ridicule
from the outside world, with his bouffant haircut, and retro-Soviet
propaganda slogans, than of condemnation—his wackiness was a
distraction and thus also a source of protection . . .
Tom Malinowski, Is There Any Way To Help the People of North Korea, THE NEW
REPUBLIC (Dec. 22, 2011), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/22/there-anyway-help-people-north-korea.
216 Letter from human rights coalition to Kim Jong-Un, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan.
8,
2012),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/08/joint-letter-supremecommander-kim-jong-un.
217 Id. The letter also noted that many were starving despite the ability of the
government to provide food and that the regime was accused of committing crimes
against humanity.
218 Id.
219 North Korea: UN Should Investigate Crimes Against Humanity: New Leader Kim
Jong-Un Indicates No Change on Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 23, 2012),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/23/north-korea-un-should-investigatecrimes-against-humanity.
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As previously noted, one of the functions of the naming and
shaming strategies employed by international human rights
organizations is to put pressure on non-offender states and
international organizations to take action against the offender state.
This is clearly the only avenue in situations such as North Korea
because of the slim prospects that the regime will undertake reforms
and the non-existence of domestic human rights groups that could
leverage international pressure to destabilize the regime. The efforts
of international advocacy groups did result in generating pressure
on states and International Organizations. For instance, the Human
Rights Council adopted a resolution against North Korea in 2012
without a single state’s opposition.220 This is significant when
viewed against the inability of that body to adopt consensual
positions against states like Libya and Burma, which also had poor
records.221
North Korea’s response to such resolutions is
unequivocal rejection. 222
Human Rights Watch campaigned for the European Union to
take action,223 “welcome[ing] the fact that [it] has co-sponsored a
number of resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly and
Human Rights Council criticizing human rights violations in North
Korea.”224 The European Parliament adopted a resolution in 2012
220 For instance, in 2010, a Human Rights Council resolution saw Indonesia,
China, Russia, Cuba, and Egypt being opposed. Indonesia in Bad Company Defending
North Korean Rights Abuses, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 31, 2010),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/03/31/indonesia-bad-company-defendingnorth-korean-rights-abuses.
221 A Human Rights Watch official stated “The Human Rights Council’s
unopposed condemnation of North Korea’s horrific human rights record is groundbreaking.” UN Human Rights Council: North Korea Condemnation Goes Unopposed,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 21, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/
23/un-human-rights-council-north-korea-condemnation-goes-unopposed.
222 See Louis Charbonneau, U.N. Members Want North Korea in International
Court for Rights Abuses, REUTERS(Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.reuters.
com/article/2014/12/18/us-northkorea-rights-un-idUSKBN0JW24420141218

("’My delegation totally rejects the resolution,’ North Korean delegate An Myong
Hun told the assembly. ‘It is a product of a political plot and confrontation.’").
223 The EU director at Human Rights Watch stated, “The European Union
needs to step up its action in response to the North Korean regime's outrageous
patterns of human rights violations . . . Establishing an independent international
commission of inquiry would be a good first step.” EU: Try to Improve Human Rights
in North Korea, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 14, 2010), https://www.hrw.
org/news/2010/06/14/eu-try-improve-human-rights-north-korea.
224 Letter from human rights coalition to EU Foreign Ministers, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (June 14, 2010), https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/14/letter-euforeign-ministers-concerning-european-union-policies-north-korean-human-ri.
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“[reiterating] its call for the DPRK to put an immediate end to the
ongoing grave, widespread and systematic human rights violations
perpetrated against its own people, which are causing North
Koreans to flee their country; [and urging DPRK] to act upon the
recommendations of the report of the [Periodic Review], and as a
first step to allow inspection of all types of detention facility by
independent international experts.”225 In November 2014, the UN
General Assembly adopted a resolution co-authored by the EU and
Japan and co-sponsored by 62 member states. 226 The EU and Japan
are also working on another resolution for adoption by the UN
Human Rights Council in early 2015 to refer the DPRK for
prosecution before the ICC for crimes against humanity.227
Other states, most notably the United States, have attempted to
respond to information about the abuses in the DPRK. At the UN,
Ambassador Power of the US noted the “growing consensus among
Council members and UN Member States that the widespread and
systematic human rights violations being committed by the North
Korean government are not only deplorable in their own right, but
also pose a threat to international peace and security.”228
225 European Parliament resolution of 24 May 2012 on the situation of North
Korean refugees. Council Directive 2012/2655, O.J. 2012/2655(RSP), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+
P7-TA-2012-0229+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. (The resolution recorded that

. . . as a direct result of the policies of the DPRK . . . it is estimated that
over the years up to 400,000 North Koreans have fled the country, many
of whom are living in neighbouring China as ‘illegal migrants . . .
according to eye-witness reports, refugees who are forcibly returned to
North Korea are systematically subjected to torture, imprisoned in
concentration camps and may even be executed, pregnant women are
allegedly forced to abort, and babies of Chinese fathers are at risk of being
killed; . . . satellite images and various accounts . . . substantiate allegations
that the DPRK operates at least six concentration camps and numerous ‘reeducation’ camps, possibly housing up to 200 000 prisoners, most of them
political.)
226 Report of the Third Committee, 69th Sess., Nov. 2014, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/69/L.28/Rev.1 (2014), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_
doc.asp?symbol=A/C.3/69/L.28/Rev.1.
227 Hyo-jin Kim, EU and Japan Submit N. Korea Human Rights Resolution,
NATIONAL(Mar. 19, 2015), available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/
nation/2015/03/116_175560.html.
228 The Ambassador stated: “[i]f you have not watched any of the hours of
victims’ testimony, or read from the hundreds of pages of transcripts from the
Commission’s public hearings, I urge you to do so. They show North Korea for
what it is: a living nightmare.” Samantha Powers, U.S. Permanent Representative to
the United Nations, Remarks by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, at a UN Security Council Session on the
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3.7. Shaming is an Effective Punishment
There is reason to believe that even an offender state that has
been labelled as a “recalcitrant” or “deviant” is responsive to
shaming. All states care about their self-image and external
reputation. The first is important to a state to ensure its legitimacy
and protect its identity and existence as a physical and legal
construct. It is what binds citizens to the state and generates
obedience to laws that underpin society. The second is important
both for instrumental and non-instrumental reasons. Reputation is
central to a state’s desirability as a partner in cooperation with other
states and business entities. This is manifested by the willingness of
states to enter into treaties, provide loans, sponsor entry into clubs,
etc. A reputation for law abidance and commitment to international
norms is also crucial for attracting foreign businesses, much needed
technological investment, and migrant labor. Therefore, it is no
surprise that all states closely guard their reputation and react with
aggressive measures at efforts to tarnish it. This explains much of
why states undertake the costly effort of explaining their actions as
being consistent with international law, and producing detailed
rebuttals and legal opinions seeking to convince domestic and
international audiences when they are accused of breaching
international obligations.
States as powerful as the United States and as recalcitrant as
North Korea both exhibit evidence of such behaviour. As elaborated
by Ambassador Powers, “ . . . the DPRK’s response [to the COI
report] . . . shows that it is sensitive to criticism of its human rights
record . . . North Korea has tried . . . to distract attention from the
report, to delegitimize its findings, and to avoid scrutiny . . . [The]
second argument for exerting additional pressure is that when
regimes warn of deadly reprisals against countries that condemn
their atrocities . . . we need [to]stand up and not back down.
Dictators who see threats are an effective tool for silencing the
international community tend to be emboldened and not placated.
And that holds true not only for the North Korean regime, but for
human rights violators around the world who are watching how the

Human Rights Situation in North Korea, December 22, 2014, available at
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/12/20141223312526.
html#ixzz3XKUPrmBx.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/5

2015]

‘RECALCITRANT’ STATES

293

Security Council responds . . . ”229 Further, DPRK officials have been
lobbying states in the months after the publication of the COI report
and offering unprecedented concessions in an attempt to dilute
adverse consequences. For instance, they raised the possibility of
the Special Rapporteur visiting North Korea.230 Although the DPRK
has ceased its lobbying efforts for the present, these responses are
indicative of its recognition of the consequences of shaming. The
COI’s report lists a number of recommendations that present a way
forward for the regime to move from recognition to rehabilitation
and reintegration if it were to accept the proposals and undertake
consequent steps.
Aside from the offender state, the COI’s work has had powerful
consequences for other states because they can no longer claim a lack
of knowledge or take cover under the plea that there is no proof.
This leaves them open to secondary shaming by other states and by
domestic groups including local human rights organisations that are
part of transnational advocacy networks. That such secondary
shaming has some potency is evidenced by the recent conduct of
Russia and China.
4. CONCLUSION
The international community cannot continue to remain a mute
spectator to the horrific abuses of human rights in North Korea. The
extraordinary testimonies of victims documented by the COI have
ensured that it is no longer possible to disclaim knowledge of the
severe breach of international law obligations by the DPRK.
Equally, we acknowledge that the current international legal system
offers limited potential for direct action in order to hold the regime
accountable for its actions. However, this does not mean that the
international community is powerless against such a recalcitrant
229 The Ambassador said, “The DPRK ramped up its propaganda machine,
publishing its own sham report on its human rights record, and claiming “the
world’s most advantageous human rights system.” [it] tried to smear the
reputations of hundreds of people . . . calling them “human scum bereft of even an
iota of conscience.” Id.
230 See North Korea Suspends Human Rights Charm Offensive, REUTERS (Nov. 11,
2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/11/north-koreasuspends-human-rights-talks (“North Korean diplomats also recently met the UN
special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea, Marzuki Darusman, for the
first time and signalled that they could allow him to visit Pyongyang if references
to the criminal court were removed from the draft.”).
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state. Rather, the enormous attention devoted to the COI’s report
since its publication illustrates the interest in applying international
law norms to such states, assessing responsibility for actions that
contravene those norms, and the desire to punish breaches. As
noted, both the assessment of responsibility and the imposition of
punishment are problematic in the context of recalcitrant states.
Previously underappreciated alternative sanctions such as shaming
might offer enforcement potential for international law in these
circumstances. The work of the COI is an excellent example of how
the objections typically levelled against shaming can be overcome.
As discussed previously, shaming by the COI overcomes the
objections of lack of authority and legitimacy. The COI possesses
authority because it was created pursuant to a formal legal process
and is conferred with a specific legal mandate. Shaming by the COI
is legitimate because (i) the international legal obligations
voluntarily assumed by the state pass the test of legality; (ii) there is
an institutional process to assess facts and apportion responsibility;
(iii) there are adequate procedural safeguards to ensure that the
offender is entitled to due process, that the adjudication is neutral,
follows precedent, and conforms to accepted standards of proof; and
(iv) there are adequate fundamental rights protections for both the
making of the underlying legal rules and the punishment of the
offender. As discussed, shaming has the effect of persuading the
violator to undertake corrective action. Even if the regime in the
DPRK is impervious to such corrective measures, shaming can be
deployed against other states in the international community as a
secondary sanction to force them to acknowledge the wrongs and
take action either unilaterally or in a coordinated fashion. As
previously noted, the familiar objections to secondary shaming—
that there is no due process, that facts are not properly established,
that the fact-finder is not neutral and independent, etc.—are not
tenable when a COI has issued a report supported by evidence
documenting grave violations of human rights. Under such
circumstances, shame sanctions ought to be deployed against states
such as Russia which hold influence over the DPRK. Faced with the
threat of shaming and related adverse consequences for reputation
and important economic interests, such states will react as typical
targets of secondary shaming do—by putting pressure on the
primary violator, the DPRK, to change its behavior and comply with
its legal obligations. A proper appreciation of shaming illustrates
the powerful role that the institution of the COI can play in
international law.
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